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I.  Executive Summary 
 
The Army is one of the oldest institutions in the United States, older even than the 
country itself.  Unlike some other nations, the United States does not have a rigid and 
distinct historical character to its force composition. It has not favored a dominant blue 
water navy over conventional ground forces, like the British. It has not conscripted 
generation after generation of young men and women into regular army service, like the 
Russians.1 It does not employ universal service, like the Israelis. The United States Army 
has a more complicated story, one that is interwoven with the founding of the nation itself. 
Through a review of primary source material, historical events, demographic 
compositions, and the first hand accounts of contemporary officers and policy makers, 
this thesis examines the deeply rooted foundational value in the Army of the citizen-
solider, how this concept has evolved from colonial days, and its implications for the 
modern United States Army. Through a historical study of the ways in which the Army 
fills its ranks, this thesis reviews the evolution of conscription and volunteerism in major 
wars in US history. It then goes on to explore two framework perspectives on the citizen-
soldier concept in greater detail. The seminal ideas of Brevet Major General Emory 
Upton calling for a professional military corps supplemented by a civilian reserve 
influenced the shape of the Army in the decades following the Civil War. And the 
proposals of General George C. Marshall to institute University Military Training 
following World War II raise interesting questions about the role and necessity of the 
citizen-solider in the Army that remain every bit as relevant, today. 
                                                        
1
 Felgenhauer, Pavel. "Russian Military Reform: Ten Years of Failure." Russian Military 
Reform: Ten Years of Failure. Sevodnya Newspaper, Moscow, 26 Apr. 1997. Web. 12 
Mar. 2013. 
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Throughout its history, the Army’s composition has fluctuated according to the 
needs of, support from, and engagement with the general public. At issue is the question 
of whether the conscripted citizen-soldier Army that cannot be easily deployed without 
considerable public support may, in fact, help avoid American intervention in 
unnecessary and costly wars. Is today’s professional army more readily used and 
deployed in unpopular, “immoral” wars than a conscripted citizen-soldier force, and if so, 
is this is a primary factor in making wars of that nature a possibility? This thesis 
concludes that the advent of the professional standing army after the Vietnam War and 
the demise of citizen-soldiers within the Army’s ranks has significantly lowered the 
political risk of going to war for American elected officials, and served to divorce the 
American public from the Army that serves and protects it. 
II.  The Foundational Values and Mission of the U.S. Army 
The Army was founded on June 14, 1775, before the United States even became 
its own sovereign nation. The original mission of the United States Army was limited and 
straightforward: to win the independence of the newly formed United States and to 
protect that freedom once it was gained.2 It was first and foremost a land-defense force. 
Though the years immediately following the Revolution and War of 1812 are viewed as 
relatively docile in retrospect, the so-called “Era of Free Security,” they certainly didn’t 
seem so secure at the time. President James Monroe in 1817 assumed leadership of a 
“barely four-decades old republic that had already fought two wars with Britain, a naval 
quasi-war with France, and border skirmishes with Spain.”3 The young country also faced 
                                                        
2
 Linn, Brian McAllister. The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007. Page 13. 
3
 Ibid. 10. 
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threats from what might today be deemed “non-state” actors harassing their borders and 
lived under the specter of a third Anglo-American War.4 All of the military’s efforts went 
towards anticipating and mitigating existential threats to the homeland. The prevailing 
defensive strategy at the time paired a strong, militia-based home guard with a powerful 
blue water navy that could engage and harass potential invaders far from friendly coasts 
as the primary means of national defense. It was in this context that the United States 
Army matured and developed. 
The United States Army was founded on the ideal of the citizen-soldier, soldiers 
with a stake in the democracy they vowed to defend. Defined by Merriam Webster as an 
“army of ordinary citizens rather than professional soldiers,” the citizen-soldier is an 
iconic symbol of participatory democracy.5 It is based on the notion of citizens as 
defenders of the nation’s values, motivated by a selfless commitment to an ideal that far 
exceeds the interest of any individual member of society.6 The generic citizen-soldier is a 
young man who comes from the wider civil society, not a “lifer.i”  These are individuals 
that remain firmly rooted in civilian life, and mark military service as an unwelcome, 
forced deviation from it. This understanding of military service instills a citizen-soldier 
army with a character and attitude that is radically different than that of a professional 
army, one that the Founders wanted a healthy dose of in American armed forces. 
The concept of the citizen-soldier was inextricably linked to another foundational 
value-- the Founding Father’s inherent bias against a large standing peacetime Army. 
                                                        
4
 Linn, 11. 
5
 "Citizen-Soldier." Merriam-Webster. Accessed February 21, 2014. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/soldier. 
6
 Hansen, Victor Davis, Courage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western 
Power New York, Doubleday, 2001 Pages 3-8.  
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The Founders were extremely wary of the coercive potential of a large standing army 
interspersed amongst the people. They had just lived with one under British rule, and they 
had no intention of returning to such a system. The young country was skeptical of all 
forms of centralized power, in fact, and their original governing document reflects that 
skepticism. The Articles of Confederation only very loosely bound the thirteen states and 
created a very weak central government. While the Articles empowered Congress to 
provide for the American military with their power to “raise and support armies,” they 
were not permitted to fund it for more than two years at a time.7 The military 
expenditures of the early Republic reflect their limited aims. The regular US Army 
existed primarily to defend the frontier and to guard the northern border from British 
aggression through Canada. Large-scale national defense was viewed as the 
responsibility of the American people, not the sole purview of the central government. 
The federally controlled regular army was to occupy an invader long enough for a 
popular army to be mustered, not to take on an attacker by itself. Such a defensive 
strategy allowed the Founders to put a cap on the size of the Army and thusly to 
ameliorate any of the perceived ill effects that came with a large standing army. 
The third foundational value of the U.S. Army is the notion of civilian rule. The 
United States was a nation founded “of the people, by the people, for the people.” The 
Founding Fathers’ self-evident truths of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” 
established a government that was designed to protect citizens’ rights. The military that 
protected their borders was not to be lorded over them, nor were the interests of the 
people to be subordinated to those of the military. Article II Section 2 Clause 1 of the 
                                                        
7
 The Articles of Confederation, Clause 12. 
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United States Constitution explicitly establishes the President of the United States, a 
civilian elected official, as the “Commander in Chief” of the nation’s armed forces.8 But 
the President does not wield unilateral control over the military. Ever wary of the power 
of one man, and seeking to log jam significant government functions to the greatest 
extent possible, the Founders gave the power to declare war, i.e. the power to decide 
when to actually use the military, to the people’s branch, Congress.9 Such a governmental 
structure was meant to make the army an easily managed arm of the people, 
representative of their interests, never superior to them. This understanding was drilled 
into the military as well. The commissioning oath for officers entering the Army includes 
swearing allegiance not to the nation but to the Constitution of the United States, 
reinforcing “we the people’ as the ultimate authority in the military chain of command.10 
Until the mid-late twentieth century, these foundational values were reflected in 
the historical pattern of mobilizing a military force during wartime: calling up the militia, 
recruiting volunteers (or resorting to conscription), and demobilizing after the war. As a 
result of this pattern, the Army’s composition, structure, and readiness have ebbed and 
flowed over time to meet an ever-changing threat. Its mission has evolved over that time 
as well. Whereas its role in colonial days was simply to protect the nation’s borders, its 
modern mission is as an expeditionary force “prepared to defeat aggression anywhere in 
                                                        
8
 Constitution of the United States, A. II,S. 2,C. 11. 
9
 Ibid. A I, S. 8, C.  
10
 United States of America. United States Army. The Officer's Oath of Office. By United 
States Army. 1959. Accessed January 12, 2014. 
http://www.army.mil/values/officers.html. 
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the world.”11  
That transition to a professional army with a more global mission happened very 
slowly. During the Revolutionary War, militias won America’s independence from 
England using poorly trained men for whom discipline was such an issue that they often 
left the battlefield at will. In the War of 1812, leadership was a problem, and during the 
Civil War, the citizen-soldiers that comprised the Union Army literally had to learn ‘on 
the job.’ The underwhelming performance of soldiers in the Spanish-American War 
attributable to a lack of training and poor pre-war readiness led to reforms at the turn of 
the century that coincided with the military’s growing role in global conflicts. The Army 
grew more professionalized throughout the twentieth century, with the major 
mobilizations of World War I and World War II bringing millions of conscripts into 
service and the creation of the first peacetime draft, in 1940. Thirty years later, the 
debacle that was the Vietnam War eroded morale and discipline to the point that the draft 
died forever, and the public had become so divorced from its military that the Army 
required a complete restructuring and rebuilding. That fundamental reimagining of the 
United States military as a result of the Vietnam War produced the modern, highly 
professionalized, All-Volunteer Force (AVF) that the country operates today. 
III. A Historiography of Army Conflicts, Conscription, and Composition 
 For most of its history, the United States has followed a consistent pattern of 
maintaining a barebones peacetime army that it frantically filled out in time of war, via 
conscription or mass volunteerism. The armies that fought almost every American war in 
                                                        
11
 United States of America. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. President 
Obama. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012. 
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history, from the Revolution to Vietnam, were broad cross sections of society, mustered 
into the force either voluntarily or through conscription. Though the details vary from 
conflict to conflict and era to era, the study of the history of American force composition 
from the country’s first war to its last reveals a clear and interesting trend. 
The Colonial Era and The American Revolution.  The draft in America, like the 
Army it feeds, is older than the United States itself.  From the earliest days of the 
colonies, militias were formed to provide for the common defense and to fill royal troop 
levies, based on a service model transplanted from England.12 While the details varied 
from one colony to the next, the same core system existed among all the colonies. One 
universal tenet was that service in the militia was compulsory. A given town or colony 
would mandate that every able-bodied man between certain ages (usually sixteen to sixty) 
present themselves and a self-furnished weapon for training on specified dates. Typically, 
training only happened four times a year, but in times of heightened security concerns it 
could be as frequent as once a month or even once a week.13  
The primary role of early American militias was to protect the hearth and home 
from local threats. When colonial governments called up their militias, they rarely did it 
en masse. Instead, they gave each militia district a quota to be filled according to 
specified enrollment numbers.14  The militias would then ask for volunteers from 
amongst their ranks. As the merits of these conflicts were not immediately evident to the 
men being asked to fight them however, volunteers were not always abundant and could 
                                                        
12
 Chambers, John Whiteclay. To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America. 
New York: Free Press, 1987. Pages 14 – 17.  
13
 Hummel, Rogers Jeffrey. "The American Militia and the Origin of Conscription: A 
Reassessment." Journal of Libertarian Studies 15, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 29-77. Page 32. 
14
 Ibid. 33. 
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usually only provide a small fraction of the requisite manpower. This fact resulted in 
America’s first conscriptions. 
A man drafted from his local militia and pressed into colonial service could, under 
normal circumstances, only be kept in service for three months and he was not to be 
made to serve beyond the borders of his home colony. Despite these theoretical 
constraints however, innumerable colonial men were conscripted and made to participate 
in long distance Indian raiding and imperial warfare against Spanish and French interests 
on the continent throughout the Colonial era.15  It is from this model that the first 
American Continental Congress derived its understanding of how to field an army for 
war. 
The typical image of American troops during the Revolution was of a 
hardscrabble volunteer “Minuteman,” so named because the trooper could drop his 
plough and grab his musket and be ready to fight the British or any other threat to his 
home at just a minute’s notice. Though this understanding is somewhat idealized, the 
Patriots of Lexington and Concord that fired the fabled “shot heard ‘round the world” 
were genuine Minutemen.  But the majority of their brothers in arms, men without whom 
the fledgling country would not have produced sufficient troops to stand up to the British, 
were fighting on less romantic and glamorous terms. 
At the beginning of the War, the Continental Army was an all-volunteer outfit. 
Men were offered cash bonuses and a promise of free western land after the war.  But as 
the war bogged down and prospects of a quick and decisive victory evaporated, so too did 
volunteer enlistments, and the Continental Army became perilously undermanned.  To 
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 Hummel, 33. 
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remedy this, the new army resorted to a “federal” draft along the same lines as the 
militias.16  The system was decentralized but far reaching. Some states conscripted any 
able-bodied male they could find, while others simply pulled from the lowest strata of 
their society.17 Either way, conscription was an important part of the story of the 
Revolutionary War and fundamental to the formation of the American Revolutionary 
fighting force. Once independence was won, the challenge became keeping it, a challenge 
aggravated by structural issues with the nascent government of the United States.  
During the course of the war, American leadership had realized that their 
governing document and sole unifying bond, the Articles of Confederation, made the 
central government virtually impotent and effectively unable to defend itself. The 
Articles enabled the creation of militias, but they were run at the state level.18 The federal 
government was neither allowed to have a standing army nor to levy taxes to raise one, 
even in the event of war. Troops had to be mustered and then “volunteered” by the states 
to the federal government.19 George Washington himself called for a system under which 
a small peacetime standing army that could be bolstered with a large, well-trained, and 
well-disciplined militia and built according to the principle of universal male conscription. 
Congress rejected this proposal. 20 It was enough of a stretch for the states to cede the 
meager authority to tax or raise an army in time of war; a universally trained and 
equipped populace was beyond even the beloved and respected Washington to institute.  
                                                        
16
 Chambers, 47. 
17
 Hummel, Rogers Jeffrey. "The American Militia and the Origin of Conscription: A 
Reassessment." Journal of Libertarian Studies 15, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 29-77. Page 38. 
18
 The Articles of Confederation, Art. VII. 
19
 Articles, Art. VIII. 
20
 Hatch, Louis Clinton. The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army. New 
York,: Longmans, Green and, 1904. Page 10. 
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Going in the opposite direction, Congress all but disbanded the Continental Army 
when the Revolutionary War ended. They retained only a token force of less than one 
regiment to hold strategic points such as West Point, and to guard the frontier.21  
Fundamentally, defense was not viewed as a federal responsibility under the Articles of 
Confederation until an existential threat to the collective emerged. An individual state’s 
border protection, for example, was thought to be the sole prerogative of that individual 
state. 
Upon the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation and the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1789, the standing army concept received a small shot in the arm, at least 
on paper. Under President Washington, the newly dubbed “United States Army” was 
authorized a standing force of 4,000 officers and men, though Congress was very 
deliberate in appropriating the funds required to recruit, train, and equip that force.22  
With the central government’s ability to fully muster a federal force thus hampered, it 
became necessary to expedite the means by which they could mobilize the militia. Thusly, 
at the behest of local military leaders, Congress began to codify the states’ right to 
conscript. The Calling Forth Act of 1792 and the Uniform Militia Act of 1794 formally 
articulated and reinforced the states’ and nation’s right to conscription, and mandated that 
every male between the ages of eighteen and forty-five serve in their local militia.23 
Those aged eighteen to twenty constituted the so-called “advanced corps,” and were 
made to drill sometimes up to thirty days out of the year, functioning much like the 
                                                        
21
 The United States Army. "The Continental Army." United States Army History. March 
2011. Accessed December 14, 2013. 
22
 Hummel, 42. 
23
 Constitution.org. "The Militia Act of 1792." The Militia Act of 1792. Accessed April 
17, 2014. 
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modern National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve.24 In this manner, the existing system of 
constant, involuntary conscription at the state level remained and was expanded upon 
after the Revolution, through the tumult of the late eighteenth century, and into the first 
round of “Indian Wars” that defined American history in the early nineteenth century. 
A significant difference between conscriptions of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and those of the twentieth is the possibility for substitutions or paid 
commutations of service. In some sense, these pre-Civil War drafts were not really 
“drafts” at all. While it is true that a great many men were forced to sacrifice their time 
and energy to drill with local militia units, few were ever forced to face an enemy’s 
weapon. When a state needed to levy troops for a campaign, it went to each of its town 
militias and first asked for volunteers. As previously noted, typically only a few would 
come forward and conscription would become necessary. Drafts of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries were local, the contemporary equivalent of “draft boards” 
precisely targeted recruits as only those familiar with an area and its people truly can.  
Often, the people drafted were not actually those the local board expected to serve.  The 
frequent practice was to serve notice to men known to be in a position to offer significant 
incentives to other men to fight in their stead. By design, these people that had been 
“drafted” would simply hire someone to volunteer in their place.25 This model of 
conscription became a tool for effectively privatizing the cost of producing volunteer 
armies.  
A look at enlistment numbers from the Revolutionary War confirms this 
phenomenon. Though precise numbers are hard to pin down, it is estimated that only 
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2.5% to 10% of the total force during the Revolutionary War had actually been drafted. 
Contrast those numbers with the estimated percentage of the total force of hired 
substitutes. As an example case, it is estimated that the Northampton, Pennsylvania 
militia was 54% hired substitute and that the New Jersey Line of the Continental Army 
was anywhere from 20% to 40% hired substitute.26 In some measure, state and federal 
governments were having their cake and eating it too.  They were able to use the threat of 
conscription to motivate people with means to recruit and deliver a volunteer force that 
was more socially expendable, and thusly easier to field for prolonged periods of time. 
The War of 1812.  The War of 1812 shows many parallels to the Revolutionary 
War.  It featured the same belligerents, on similar battlefields, with fundamentally 
unchanged tools and tactics.  It also featured a U.S. Army put together in largely the same 
way.   
When the great anti-Federalist Thomas Jefferson became President in 1801, he 
slashed the military’s budget and authorized personnel strength.  In somewhat of a 
contrast to his advocacy of a “blue water” navy while he was Minister to France, 
Jefferson envisioned defending the American coast with swarms of privately owned 
gunboats manned by citizen-sailors, pouring out of the nation’s harbors and 
overwhelming the capacity of invading fleets to sink them.27 His approach to land 
defenses was similar. The consummate opponent of the standing army, Jefferson shrank 
the army to a token force while furthering reliance on the militia.28 He sought to structure 
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an Army that could withstand a foreign invasion long enough for his universally armed 
and trained male population to organize an effective resistance. Through Jefferson’s 
advocacy and despite a reticent Congress, the institutional reliance on the militia that had 
been bred into the young United States in its experience during the Revolution was 
cemented in the early years of the nineteenth century. This system would shortly be put to 
the test however, as within a decade of Jefferson leaving office, British troops would 
again be at America’s door. 
The War of 1812 was not a popular cause among the general populace. Indeed, 
this war divided public sentiment as much as any war in American history, including 
Vietnam.29 Many American citizens were angry over the impressment of their 
countrymen into Royal Navy service, but most were unwilling to go to war over it.  In 
consequence, the young United States was forced to rely heavily on conscription to 
furnish the necessary troop strength. But a national conscription bill never passed 
through Congress.30  Instead, Jefferson’s beloved militias were called forth, en toto, to 
serve in the active force.  
Some suspect that the American declaration of war against the British in 1812 
was offensive and expansionist in nature, an opportunistic attempt at a Canadian land 
grab. England’s army was tied up on the continent fighting Napoleon, and her navy was 
stretched thin enforcing a blockade of most of the western European coast. President 
Madison and his supporters in Congress believed the United States could take advantage 
of Britain’s diverted attention to seize territories denied to them in the 1783 Treaty of 
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Paris, and simultaneously eliminate the possibility of a British-backed Native American 
confederation of tribes in the Midwest impinging upon future American expansion.31 
However, with a regular army of fewer than 12,000 men, the Americans could not 
summon sufficient numbers of professional soldiers to dispossess the British of their 
Canadian holdings, or to wage a sustained campaign against Native Americans in the 
West.32  Quasi-conscripted citizen-soldiers of the state militias were asked to do the job 
instead. They failed, quite fantastically. But American politicians would learn a valuable 
lesson from that failure. While state militias would go on to serve valiantly and 
effectively over the course of the war when fighting on their home soil, citizen-soldiers 
proved to be utterly ineffective as instruments of imperial power. This lesson would be 
taken to heart when American politicians next considered waging wars of dispossession, 
in the middle and end of the nineteenth century. 
The Civil War.  The middle of the nineteenth century brought the greatest crisis in 
American military and political history, the Civil War. Thoughts of westward expansion 
were put on hold as the Union waged a bitter war to hold itself together.  
 The early years of the Union draft during the Civil War offer another striking 
parallel to the Revolution. Of Lincoln’s initial call for 75,000 troops, all were 
conventional volunteers. But once the war got underway in earnest, and it became clear to 
the public that victory would come with a high human cost, volunteer enlistments slowed 
to a trickle and a draft was used to fill the ranks. 
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As the war progressed, conscription slowly became a more centralized process, 
until ultimately the Enrollment Act of 1863 was passed and there was unilateral federal 
control over conscription for the first time in American history.33 Though changes to the 
old system were enacted under this conscription format to make it more like a modern 
draft, many of the fundamental processes remained the same. While the “commutation” 
was abolished by the draft of 1864, paid substitutes still comprised the majority of 
“drafted” soldiers.34  To avoid service, substitute soldiers could be hired for three 
hundred dollars. Naturally, this practice was widely perceived to be profoundly 
undemocratic and unfair, and people put their dissatisfaction on display. In July of 1863, 
1,000 people died in draft riots in New York City, as people protested the injustice of the 
system. Clearly, there were fundamental flaws in the federal government’s drafting 
mechanisms that needed redress. Though the Civil War was in many ways the first 
“modern war” in American history (or at least it was the one that finally prompted them 
to modernize), the means by which they assembled their army were more eighteenth 
century than nineteenth. 
 The years immediately following the Civil War through to the start of the Spanish 
American War display striking similarities to the way in which the modern army mans 
itself, and offer a distant mirror to our contemporary situation. By the time the Civil War 
ended in April 1865, there were over 1 million men under arms in the Union Army. By 
late November of the same year, more than 800,000 of those men had been discharged 
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and sent home.35 Demobilization and reorganization continued at that rapid pace for the 
next two years, with the Army shrinking to just over 54,000 officers and men by 
September of 1867, all of them professionals. This was the largest that the Army would 
be for the next three decades.36 
During those roughly three decades from 1867 - 1898, the Army’s officer corps 
was comprised almost exclusively of West Point graduates. The officers that constitute 
“The Long Grey Line” have always been seen as the true military professionals within 
the ranks. Those that came out of lesser academies (VMI, the Citadel, Norwich) or the 
ROTC (founded 1866) were not considered true “military men,” but simply men that 
were in the military. Their shorter durations of service reflected this. The enlisted side, 
too, saw an increase in professionalization. The enlisted American soldiers doing the 
fighting in the post-Civil War era were (relative to conscripted troops) highly trained men 
on longer-term enlistments. They were predominantly cavalrymen, requiring greater 
investment in both money and training than any other sort of trooper. They were the 
epitome of the enlisted military professional, serving in an army comprised entirely of 
long-term volunteers. The army had come to be manned and led entirely by “lifers.” 
The Indian Wars.  In the twenty-five years between the end of the Civil War in 
1865 and Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous 1890 declaration that “the frontier was 
closed,” the U.S. Army fought in at least forty-five distinct “wars” against individual 
Native American tribes or coalitions.37 38 The smaller scale and lower intensity (relative 
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to the Civil War) of these conflicts translated to a lower manpower necessity, enabling 
policy makers to rely on an all-volunteer force rather than dragooning local militias into 
federal service or subjecting the general populace to a draft. Those distant and oft-
forgotten frontier wars would be almost the sole occupation of the newly professionalized 
American Army for the next quarter-century. 
Throughout this era in US history, Congress repeatedly sought to reduce the 
funding and size of the Army. Though some officers and men may have enjoyed the 
rugged life of a smaller army in a state of permanent semi-war, none of them enjoyed 
being under-funded and undermanned while they were at it. During this time, the Army 
lost much of its public prestige and fell away from the public eye:  
“[the Army] was unseen, unpopular, or unknown. Northerners were disinterested in it, 
 southerners disliked it, and westerners no longer needed it. In 1877, as a result of political 
 manipulations centering around the end of Reconstruction, the  officers and men of the United 
 States Army went a full year without pay.”39  
 
All of this occurred while the Army was still very much engaged in the West (the officers 
and men fighting in the Great Sioux War actually went unpaid through some of it). The 
fact that westerners in particular could ignore their fellow citizens that were suffering on 
their behalf is a brutal indictment of the professional army model. This public negligence, 
brought about by the professionalization and subsequent marginalization of the military, 
created the battered and exhausted United States Army that closed out the nineteenth 
century, and a public that remained conveniently ignorant of it, content to reap the 
rewards of the blood, sweat, and suffering of their countrymen while offering none of 
their own. 
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The Spanish-American War. The Army’s social isolation ended in 1898 with the 
onset of the Spanish-American War. As the United States was fairly late arriving on the 
international scene, it had missed the “golden era” of western imperialism. But after 
watching most of Western Europe gobble up the globe, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, America decided that she wanted some colonies of her own. The only problem 
was that most of the “pie” had already been carved up (and eaten, in many cases).  The 
United States would not be able to add any colonies to its burgeoning empire without 
taking them from someone else. The US identified the Spanish holding of Cuba as a 
convenient and potentially soft target, and so they sought to drum up a context under 
which they might invade and seize the small island, fifty miles off the Florida coast.  
When the U.S.S. Maine exploded and sank in Havana Harbor in February of 1898, 
the sought after pretext was provided. “Yellow journalists” like William Randolph Hearst 
and Joseph Pulitzer began drumming up a veritable public frenzy for a war with Spain, 
the presumed culprit (though internal Navy investigations have shown that the sinking 
was likely the cause of a shipboard magazine exploding). But in 1898 the US Army was 
woefully unprepared for a war with a legitimate first world power, as Spain was 
perceived to be at the time. The Army numbered only 28,000 officers and men on the day 
the Maine sank. To mitigate this, Congress immediately declared all males between 18 
and 45 subject to military duty.40 Within a few months the Army would swell to more 
than 220,000. Every additional man was a volunteer.41 They fought a quick but poorly 
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managed war of only eight months before American objectives were met and the massive 
volunteer army was ushered out of service. 
During the almost two decades from the turn of the century to the beginning of 
American involvement in WWI, the mission of the US military changed.  While it is 
often thought of as a fairly peaceful time for the United States, it was, in fact, an era of 
previously unprecedented foreign interventionism.42 The Spanish-American War served 
as somewhat of a coming out party for United States power. The US became an 
undisputed regional hegemon, sending marines and soldiers to no fewer than ten 
countries in the western hemisphere, including Panama to seize the canal zone and Puerto 
Rico, which remains an American territory to this day.43 But in addition to these 
neighborhood police actions (or conquests), the US began to play the role of global 
power projector. Having taken the Philippine Islands in the Spanish American War, the 
US fought a Filipino insurgency, and even landed troops in China as part of an 
international coalition suppressing the Boxer Rebellion, going so far as to leave a 
garrison in China to continue protecting American interests there indefinitely.44  
These more muscular policies were carried out by volunteer troops. The men who 
had fought the Spanish-American war had not signed up to build an empire. When peace 
was signed and their enlistments ran out, they went home. A new force of professional 
soldiers was recruited from the general populace to fill the void they left, a force that 
would fight a long, low intensity war to secure the spoils of American conquest. The 
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fighting experienced in the Philippines and other far off places by these soldiers and 
Marines was some of the most brutal counter-insurgency warfare in American history, 
though the fact that it was endured by only a very small professional force, far from the 
public eye, made it easier to compartmentalize for the American public. While a massive 
public debate from these overseas forays did take place (particularly over the Philippines), 
no meaningful action was taken. This fit with a then emerging pattern that has continued 
intermittently to the present. 
The World Wars.  The next great surge in interest in military matters came in the 
buildup to American involvement in World War I. The American public, ever ready to 
heed George Washington’s warning and avoid getting wrapped up in the troubles of 
Europe, was initially very reticent to get involved. However, there had arisen a new 
cohort of American politicians, a fresh brand of Republicans who had been emboldened 
by the successes of the previous decades’ conquests, that advocated American military 
expansion and involvement in the war on behalf of the English.   
These were men such as former President Roosevelt, former Secretary of War 
Elihu Root, and future Secretary of War Henry Stimson. They found an ally across the 
aisle in President Woodrow Wilson, an intellectual idealist from the Democratic Party. 
Wilson desired to stay out of the war, but more than that, he desired for the U.S. to broker 
the inevitable peace that would follow the war. If that meant getting involved as a 
combatant and shedding American blood, he would ask (or tell) American kids to do just 
that.  
Unfortunately, neither the Army nor the Navy were manned or equipped for a war 
with first-rate world powers, and Wilson’s 1917 call for volunteers went largely 
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unheeded. Only 73,000 men had voluntarily joined the Army by the time war was 
declared with Germany, whereas Wilson had asked for 1 million.45 History had made 
clear that the National Guard (federal militias) could not be relied upon for sustained 
overseas campaigning, so the President resorted to a federal draft. History had also made 
clear that previous models of conscription would not produce a sufficient overseas 
fighting force, however. So under the direction of the profoundly influential John 
McAuley Palmer, the United States passed the Selective Service Act of 1916 
(implemented in 1917) and codified the first modern-style draft in its history. This law 
compelled all males between the ages of twenty-one and thirty to register for the draft 
(amended in 1918 to include all males between eighteen and thirty-five).46  
For the first time in American history, the draft was an entirely federal affair. Also 
a first in American history, the practice of hiring a substitute was expressly forbidden 
throughout. Any man called upon to serve was legally compelled to do just that (from this 
era emerged what is by now an old favorite marching cadence of American soldiers that 
begins: “Got a letter in the mail/ Go to war or go to jail”). The institution of the draft also 
drove up voluntary enlistment significantly, though there remained significant opposition 
to the first rounds of drafts. During the first drawing, 50,000 men applied for exemptions 
and over a quarter of a million men failed to register.47 Despite that initial reservation, 
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two million men would eventually volunteer to fight in WWI, and another 2.8 million 
men would be drafted.48  
This was the first time in American history that the country fielded a 
predominantly conscript Army. It was also the first time that citizen-soldiers would prove 
themselves effective in an offensive war. Citizen-soldiers had performed well in combat 
before, but never on such a scale and never so far from home. This improvement may be 
attributable to the Selective Service Act’s federal bent that enabled the US Army to 
ensure the quality of soldier that they were sending into action as never before. 
Regardless, it was a significant break from previous policy and a momentous turning 
point in the history of United States Army force composition.  
After the war, the draft was halted, and, as it always had, the Army reverted back 
to a relatively small professional force. But this army assumed the new burden of being 
the enforcement mechanism of a bona fide world power. The Army had men in active 
combat in South America, Europe, and Asia intermittently throughout the 1920’s.49 The 
decade following WWI may have been the “roaring 20’s” for the average American, but 
for a small cadre of professional American soldiers, it was a time of high-tempo overseas 
deployments.  
The “roaring 20’s” soon gave way to the very depressing 1930’s, however, and 
America was forced to pull back from world affairs and turn her gaze inward. Her age old 
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isolationist streak reemerged. After 1932, Americans would not be asked to serve 
overseas again until almost a decade later, in World War II. 
World War II broke out in Europe in September of 1939. When France fell the 
following spring, the general feeling in the United States was that war was inevitable. In 
order to prepare, on September 16, 1940, the United States enacted the first peacetime 
draft in its history: the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. This law required all 
men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty six (again amended to eighteen to sixty 
five when the war broke out) to register for the draft.50 The peacetime draft was fairly 
limited and the service requirement attached to it only one year. Once the US entered the 
war in December of 1941, however, the draft ramped up dramatically and service 
commitments were extended to “the duration of the war, plus six months.”51 Voluntary 
enlistments also surged in the immediate aftermath of Peal Harbor, but as they had in 
WWI, the Civil War, and every major American war before that, volunteer enlistments 
petered out as the war dragged on, and they ultimately proved unable to sustain the 
manpower needs of a war of such incredible scale. 
By the end of the war, more than fifty million men had been registered for the 
draft and over eleven million were actually inducted into the service.52 This resulted in a 
force composition of roughly 6.3 million volunteers (approximately 39%), and about 11.5 
million soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines entered the service via the draft, translating 
to approximately 61% of the total force.53 
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Once the steep learning curve of early defeats was weathered, America’s drafted 
military acquitted itself remarkably well. Fueled by a belief in the righteousness of their 
cause, instilled with training generally superior to that of their enemies (particularly as 
the war progressed), and driven by the substantial industrial might of the United States, 
American citizens that had almost all been private citizens thirty-six to forty-eight months 
earlier, helped liberate the great capitals of Europe and defeat Japan. Combat 
effectiveness was clearly not a problem for a citizen-soldier army. 
The Cold War.  As early as the end of the War in 1945, a full year before 
Churchill’s famous “Iron Curtain” speech, there were respected American and Allied 
officials calling for a re-armament of Germany and a combined arms march onto 
Moscow.54 Though this view is often written off as zealous war mongering, the sentiment 
cannot be so easily pigeonholed. American leaders over the course of WWII knew full 
well that communist Russia was going to be the next great thorn in their side. They 
recognized that both countries would emerge from the war as super powers, and that they 
would be jostling for global primacy for years to come. Accordingly, the American 
presence in Europe was overwhelming at the close of WWII. Unwilling to make the same 
mistake that they had after WWI, the United States ensured that it kept enough troops 
overseas after the war to send a clear message about who would be the “decider’ in 
Western Europe. The US had missed an opportunity in 1919 to become the master of 
Europe and the center of a new world order. It had no intention of doing so again. 
But even though there was a massive, experienced, and well-equipped United 
States Army sitting in Central Europe at the end of WWII, a hot war against Russia in 
                                                        
54
 Fordham University. "Winston S. Churchill: "Iron Curtain Speech", March 5, 1946." 
Fordham University: Internet History Sourcebooks. 1997. Accessed April 5, 2014. 
 27
1945 was simply not going to happen. There were a number of reasons for this. The 
fundamental, most important reason, however, was that neither the Army nor the 
American public (of which, as a citizen-solder army, the army of 1945 was extremely 
representative), was willing to continue the fight. American mothers and fathers had sent 
their sons to end fascism and to protect immediately threatened national interests, nothing 
more than that. The battered Army that had just fought its way through North Africa, 
Italy, and Western Europe, and the Navy and Marine Corps that had island-hopped 
through the South Pacific, were simply not willing to keep fighting, nor were their 
families back home willing to sit idly by while they did so. The men saw their job as 
done, and they were ready to go home. Regardless of what the geopolitical realities were, 
or what influence the military-industrial complex (a term that did not then exist) might 
have wielded, the most important factor limiting further American action after WWII was 
the composition of the force. If the government wanted to fight communists as it had 
Indians a century earlier, it would need a different Army.  
So after WWII, the Army began to transition once again. This began with a failed 
attempt by General of the Army George C. Marshall at a revolutionary overhaul of the 
American citizen-soldier service model with his call for Universal Military Training 
(Section III). But despite its unwillingness to adopt Marshall’s reforms, the country did 
seek to address its shifting service priorities in the wake of WWII. The Cold War 
presented different challenges from the recently ended two-front total war, and 
consequently, the military’s needs were different. The draft was scaled back dramatically 
and the Selective Service Action (as it exists today) was instituted in 1948. 
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The Korean War.  Even though the draft was not as far reaching as it had been, it 
never completely went away; it surged to meet the elevated troop needs of the Korean 
War. The Korean War draft exempted World War II veterans and called for eighteen to 
thirty-five year old men to serve out two-year obligations. The prospect of being drafted 
helped encourage and sustain a steady stream of “shotgun volunteer” enlistments, as a 
drafted man had much less leeway in determining his branch and component than one 
who had voluntarily entered the military.55  
Officers and politicians of the day knew the effect that the draft had on the 
military-eligible population. General Lewis Hershey, the Director of the Selective Service 
System, often testified before Congress in defense of the draft, making the case that “for 
every man drafted, three or four more were scared into volunteering.”56 This flow of 
voluntary recruits was vital to the United States’ ability to continue to project power 
throughout the world. While most of America’s post-Korea, pre-Vietnam foreign 
engagements came in the form of clandestine operations, soldiers and sailors were still 
frequently dispatched to foreign hot spots in the Middle East, South America, and Asia.57 
The Vietnam War.  The hot spot that saw increasing US attention in the 1950’s, 
particularly from 1954 onward, was French Indochina, or Vietnam. The American 
involvement in Vietnam began under President Eisenhower with the enunciation of the 
“Domino Theory” and his commitment to defending democracies against Soviet 
incursion, expanded under Kennedy, and dramatically escalated under Johnson. The draft 
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was expanded under all three presidents successively in order to meet yet another 
burgeoning manpower need. Out of a registered pool of approximately 27 million 
American males, roughly 2.25 million were inducted into the military, but the draft’s 
most profound effect was cajoling men to voluntarily enlist or to volunteer for the draft 
(like my own father). All told, 8.7 million Americans entered the Army “by choice” and 
constituted the majority of the 3.4 million men that ultimately found themselves in 
Vietnam between 1964 and 1975.58 
The Vietnam War stirred greater public passion and vitriol on the part of the 
American people than any war before or since. While not every American was against the 
war, the preponderance certainly was. The most vocal opponent was the baby boomer 
generation that was coming of age right in the midst of the conflict, and that bore the 
brunt of its fighting. In response to Vietnam there were large-scale, popular anti-draft 
demonstrations for the first time since the Civil War. The system of liberal deferments 
which had grown up during the period of low draft calls following the Korean War had 
come to be seen as a means by which the most privileged members of society could avoid 
service, a distant mirror to the paid substitution system of the Civil War era that 
precipitated the last round of draft riots in America. In an effort to ameliorate this, in 
1970, Nixon ordered the random selection lottery. It did not erase the sense of unfairness, 
but merely changed the focus from victimization of the underprivileged to victimization 
of the unlucky; protests only grew. The pressure mounted by the baby boomers and by 
the broad social coalition that they formed in opposition to the Vietnam War was such 
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that, for the first time in American history, a war was ended not by the capitulation of the 
enemy, but by the weight domestic opposition. 
 Out of this ‘defeat’ emerged from the military a modern American spin on the 
“stabbed in the back” narrative of the defeated Weimar Germany. The professional 
remnants of the post-Vietnam Army felt similarly betrayed by an unsupportive and 
detached public. Losing the war without losing a significant battle led to an “if only we 
didn’t have to fight this war with two hands tied behind our back and a blindfold on” 
institutional explanation for the Army’s defeat.59 The military grew to resent the public 
and rejected their perceived “softness.” Likewise, the American public sought to distance 
itself from the military. The average citizen that had opposed the war and that could not 
fathom why anyone would fight was content to let the “baby-killing warmongers” that 
would have liked nothing more than to nuke Hanoi quarantine themselves in an isolated, 
alternative warrior society.  
The Vietnam draft pushed the idea of a conscript army completely out of public 
favor. In consequence, and with the mutual approval of both the public and the military, 
the draft was officially ended in 1973 with the introduction of the professional, “All-
Volunteer Force” (AVF). While eighteen to twenty-six year old males are still required to 
register for Selective Service, there are no legal ramifications for failing to do so and no 
one has been involuntarily inducted into the service in all that time anyway. Today, the 
draft is dead. The concept of national service or the like is occasionally floated, but 
elected officials at the national level seem to have reached the consensus that 
conscription of any kind is either unhealthy for the nation, political suicide, or both.  
                                                        
59
 Prados, 514 – 517. 
 31
Figure I.  Chart of Mobilization by Major War 
 
 
In summary, Figure I. shows that every major war since the American Revolution has 
been fought by citizen-soldiers who were called up either as volunteers or through 
conscription, only to be demobilized following the war.  The notable exception is the 35 
years of Indian Wars fought by small group of professional soldiers detached from and 
largely out of sight of the public eye. 
 
Data Sources:  
Population Data: U.S. Census Bureau 
URL: http://www.census.gov/easystats/# 
Military Size Data: Department of Defense 
URL: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004598.html 
Military Casualty Data: Defense Casualty Analysis System 
URL: https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties.xhtml 
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War American 
Revolution 
War of 
1812 
Mexican 
American 
War 
Civil War60 Indian 
Wars61 
Spanish 
American 
War 
US 
Population 
3,929,214 7,239,881 23,191,876 31,443,321 49,371,340 76,212,168 
Pre-war 
Military 
Size 
062  
(0%)63 
12,000 
(0.12%) 
12,500 
(0.05%) 
16,000 
(0.05)%) 
15,000 
(0.03%) 
26,000 
(0.03%) 
War Time 
Military 
Size 
200,000 
(5.1%) 
286,730 
(3.9%) 
78,718 
(0.34%) 
2,213,363 
(7.04%) 
27,000 
(0.05%) 
306,760 
(4.2%) 
US KIA 4,435 2,260 13,283 364,511 1,000 2,446 
       
War World War 
I 
World War 
II 
Korean War Vietnam 
War 
Desert 
Storm 
Global War 
on Terror 
US 
Population 
106,021,568 132,165,129 151,325,798 203,211,926 248,709,873 308,745,531 
Pre-war 
Military 
Strength 
100,000 
(.09%) 
189,000 
(0.14%) 
1,459,462 
(0.96%) 
2,653,926 
(1.03%) 
1,985,555 
(.80%) 
1,384,338 
(.44%) 
War Time 
Military 
Strength 
4,734,991 
(4.5%) 
16,112,566 
(12.2%) 
5,720,000 
(3.78%) 
8,744,000 
(4.03%) 
2,322,000 
(.93%) 
1,369,532 
(.44%) 
US KIA 116,516 405,399 36,574 58,220 383 6,80064 
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IV.  Two Models for Citizen-Soldier Service 
 The preceding historiography shows the defining role of the citizen-soldier in 
American military conflicts since the colonial era. The American debate on the role the 
citizen-soldier is well captured by studies of the works Brevet Major General Emory 
Upton and General George C. Marshall, both of whom sought to shape and sculpt the 
Army in their time. Upton’s seminal work on professionalism influenced the organization 
of the Army in the decades after the Civil War, and Marshall’s proposal for Universal 
Military Training following World War II raised interesting questions about the role and 
importance of the citizen-solider in today’s Army that remain relevant today.  
The Post-Civil War Transition: Emory Upton and the Attempt to Reform 
 Emory Upton was perhaps the most important and prolific American military 
intellectual in a century that produced such notables as Silvanus Thayer and Alfred T. 
Mahan.  While he never made the rank that many of his more famous friends and 
colleagues would, he nonetheless revolutionized American military thinking in the 
nineteenth century. Seemingly a walking contradiction, Upton’s battlefield experience 
during the Civil War established the feasibility of well trained and disciplined citizen-
soldiers, while his subsequent, tireless scholarship on the topic of Army composition 
seemed to set out to invalidate those experiences. In the years following the Civil War, 
the Army’s Commanding General, William T. Sherman, sent Upton on a world tour to 
observe and report on the armies of almost every major country in the world. His account 
of the expedition and his ensuing publications took a hard look at the past military 
policies of the United States, and became the foundation for major American military 
reform in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
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Emory Upton was born on August 27, 1839 on a family farm in the Northwest 
corner of New York State. He grew up in an extremely religious home in an extremely 
religious part of the country. Upton’s father inculcated the young Emory with the belief 
that hard work and discipline were virtues and that idle time or leisurely pursuits were an 
affront to God.  His father told him “in a world with so much darkness there was no time 
for foolishness.”65 When he was fourteen years old, Upton read a biography of Napoleon 
and decided that he wanted to be a soldier. At fifteen, he requested an appointment to 
West Point from his Congressman, but was told to get more education first. Upton spent 
two years at Oberlin College in Ohio, working tirelessly to prepare himself for West 
Point’s entrance exams, and in early 1856, he was finally appointed to West Point’s class 
of 1861. 
Upton’s time and experiences at West Point would prove to be extremely 
formative. They would ingrain in him a bias against the citizen-soldier that he would 
carry with him (to varying degrees) for the entirety of his Army career. During his second 
year, Upton took a class on tactics taught by 1839 graduate Henry Wager Halleck. 
Halleck’s textbook repeatedly used historical examples to excoriate the militia and 
National Guard as effectively useless in modern combat.66 Upton was taught that the only 
demographic truly capable of handling the nation’s defense was the professional, career 
soldier led by the professional, career officer. 
An already stern and judgmental man immersed in a world of professional 
soldiers with extremely limited civilian interaction, Upton came to disdain civilian 
meddling in military affairs. His distaste was furthered by the rampant practice of filling 
                                                        
65
 Ambrose, 7. 
66
 Ibid. 11. 
 34
vacancies in the Army with nepotistic civilian appointments. With such a small standing 
army, the small cadre of officers that West Point and a few other institutions such as VMI 
and the Citadel produced was considered adequate, with any gaps in the Army’s needs 
filled by the direct appointment of the Secretary of War or other powerful civilian leaders. 
The direct appointment of often under qualified (other than having the right uncle or 
cousin) civilians into the military irked Upton enough, but his ire was roused further by 
the fact that these civilians received their commissions before the West Pointers did each 
year, meaning the civilians in each commissioning cohort technically outranked the 
professional soldiers. These experiences instilled in Upton certain ideas about civil-
military relations, but his experience during the Civil War would morph those ideas into 
an unshakeable conviction. 
 Upton was commissioned on May 6, 1861.67 By the time of his commission, the 
rebels had already fired on Fort Sumter and the Civil War had begun. States were 
scrambling to assemble regiments and were desperate for officers to lead them. Many of 
Upton’s West Point classmates accepted regimental commands of the volunteer forces of 
their home states, serving in the rank of volunteer Colonel while retaining their regular 
army rank of Second Lieutenant. Jumping into the Army as a brevetted Colonel would 
seem like an attractive route for a man singularly possessed with making rank and 
becoming the “most famous soldier in the country,” but Upton did not consider entering a 
volunteer unit for a second.6869 He knew that had he chosen to serve in a New York 
volunteer regiment, he would have led untrained civilians under an untrained general. His 
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years at the academy had sufficiently prejudiced him against citizen-soldiers that he 
actively avoided service alongside or underneath them, despite the prospect of easy and 
immediate rank and reward. 
The early years of the Civil War were very eventful for Upton. He served with 
distinction as an artillery officer and aide-de-camp at the Battle of Bull Run, in the 
Peninsular Campaign, and at Antietam. He earned high praise from his superiors in the 
regular army, but that distinction earned him only orders to West Point to serve as a 
tactics instructor. Upton did not want to leave the war. He loved being a field commander, 
and he was as good at it as he expected he would be. So, upon hearing that the 
commander of the 121st New York Infantry Regiment had declared himself unfit for 
service and resigned his commission, Upton pursued the post. In October of 1862, Upton 
became a “Colonel of Volunteers” and somewhat apprehensively took command of a 
volunteer regiment.70 
Upon arrival at his new outfit, Upton put each of his subordinate officers through 
a battery of tests akin to those that he went through at West Point. These resulted in a 
number of politically appointed officers resigning in disgust, which was precisely 
Upton’s intention. He replaced those men with qualified officers of his choosing. He next 
set about disciplining the enlisted side of his volunteer unit to the regular army’s standard. 
He had them drilling incessantly to the point that the 121st New York Infantry Regiment 
was dubbed “Upton’s Regulars,” a somewhat ironic moniker that they would keep for the 
duration of the war. The disciplined paid dividends, however, as the 121st acquitted itself 
extremely well in combat in numerous engagements, most notably at Fredericksburg and 
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Gettysburg. The experience of leading a regiment of citizen-soldiers highlighted to Upton 
the potential for martial competence in civilians, if provided proper professional 
leadership and instilled with sufficient discipline. 
While he had a positive citizen-soldier experience with the 121st New York, 
Upton was horrified and enraged by most of his wartime experiences with them. Over the 
course of the war, Upton served in the artillery, infantry, and cavalry, rising to the rank of 
brevet Major General. In these subsequent postings Upton had negative experiences with 
citizen-soldiers that served to validate his pre-war prejudices. On many occasions during 
his service, he witnessed citizen-soldiers doing things that went against everything that 
had been so deeply ingrained in him as a professional officer. He once came across a 
group of volunteer soldiers sitting off to the side of a battle refusing to fight because the 
terms of their enlistment contracts had been violated.71 He was himself repeatedly passed 
over for promotion throughout the war for political reasons, despite his clearly superior 
military merit.72 Hand in hand with that issue was Upton’s recognition of the fact that 
Union troops, volunteer and professional alike, were very poorly led. He wrote in the 
aftermath of the disaster at Cold Harbor, “Some of our corps commanders are not fit to be 
corporals.”73 There are innumerable accounts of young First Lieutenant Upton 
indignantly fixing the haphazard or unsound troop placements of an inept politically 
appointed Colonel.74 These experiences galvanized the now war-seasoned Emory Upton, 
and with the great crusade of his professional career over before his twenty-sixth birthday, 
Upton set out to make his mark on the peacetime Army. 
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In the years following the Civil War until his death in 1881, Upton sought to 
become a military theorist of international renown, in the vein of Carl von Clausewitz 
and Antoine-Henri Jomini. He traveled extensively through Europe and Asia before 
returning to the United States and attempting to apply the lessons he learned to the US. 
While many of his initial reforms focused on tactics (Upton was a renowned tactical 
innovator during the war), all of his later attempts at reform were on the strategic and 
policy level.  This reform movement had a profound effect on military thinking in the US 
both within the institution of the Army and by political leadership, and served as the 
guiding hand of American military policy through the turn of the century and beyond.  
In the latter part of 1875 and well into 1876, Upton traveled extensively through 
Europe and Asia as an official observer for the United States Army.75 He travelled with 
two fellow officers: Brevet Brigadier General George A. Forsyth and Major Joseph P 
Sanger.76 Among the three of them, they were to learn as much as they could about the 
drills, tactics, and implementations of other countries’ infantry, cavalry, and artillery for 
application in the United States.77 Their first stop was Japan, a country from which they 
expected to learn very little. As most western men would have at the time, Upton and his 
colleagues carried a degree of prejudice with them to Japan. They were skeptical that an 
“oriental” culture could teach them anything about the military arts.78 Upon arrival, they 
were very pleasantly surprised to find that they were wrong. All three men commented on 
the unexpected proficiency with which the Japanese infantry, cavalry, and artillery 
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executed battle drills that would leave “little to apprehend even in direct competition with 
the crack regiments of the line of the United States.”79 From Japan Upton and his 
colleagues travelled to China, where they would have one of the more formative 
experiences of their trip.  
Upton was shocked by the state of Chinese military affairs as he found them. The 
first thing he noticed in China was the cultural indifference that the Chinese people had to 
military service. He opens his section on discipline in the Chinese Army by stating, 
“China is the only country [he visited] in which the profession of arms is not honored.”80 
He goes on to quote a Chinese proverb to that effect: “as you would not use a good iron 
to make a nail, so you would not use a good man to make a soldier.”81 This indifference 
to the military and to military service manifested itself deleteriously in many ways, 
according to Upton. Their weapons and tactics were severely outdated, prompting him to 
comment that the “Chinese army is as backward in its tactics as in its armament.”82 In the 
text of Armies, Upton mocks their primitive, flintlock musket-toting infantry and saber-
brandishing cavalry. He attributes all of China’s tactical and technical challenges to their 
public attitude towards military service. He believes that because they institutionally 
funnel only the dregs of their society into service, the military and therefore the culture as 
a whole suffers at all levels. He identifies bureaucratic civilian control of the army in 
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China as the fundamental problem.83 It is his experience in China that precipitates a shift 
in Upton’s tour and review of the armies of Europe and Asia from the mere study of their 
weapons and tactics to a deeper policy analysis. 
From China, Upton and his cohorts traveled to India to watch British military drill 
in action. Upton is very praiseworthy of the organizational and logistical proficiency of 
the British officer corps in India, but is left generally uninspired by their tactical doctrine. 
While Upton does not glean much from a tactical standpoint while in India, his 
observations of colonial armies and the colonizer-native relationship, particularly as it 
pertains to military service, prove to be important experiences. He concludes that a 
reliance on native populations is politically complicated and militarily inefficient. He 
notes the “frequent mutinies that have broken out among the native troops” that have 
“their source in the deep religious animosities and prejudices of the races.”84 Again, 
while tactics are painstakingly described and unit organizations thoroughly listed, the key 
lessons he gleans are at the policy level. He is thinking at this point in his journey more 
about the way in which armies are fielded than how they’re used once they get there. 
From India, Upton briefly visits Persia, modern day Iran. The first sentence of his 
section on Persia sums up his findings exactly: “The decline in military organization from 
India to Persia is scarcely less marked than from Japan to China.”85 His disdain translates 
into effort as well as sentiment, and he devotes only eight pages of his roughly four 
hundred-page treatise on the armies of Europe and Asia to their study. 
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After Persia, Upton finally arrives in Europe. It is clear in his chapter bridging the 
sections on Europe and Asia that Europe was all along meant to be the focal point of his 
trip. The reasons for his European focus are fascinating and revealing. He says of the 
armies of Asia that: “the chief object of all these armies is the maintenance of order and 
peace within their borders.”86 The armies of Europe, by contrast, are designed to a 
fundamentally different end. They are to “contend for new territory and increased 
power…With the object for which they are maintained clearly in view, it is to the armies 
of Europe that we ought to look for the best military models.”87 With those words, Upton 
is tacitly acknowledging that the United States Army’s mission has grown beyond the 
mere defense of the homeland, and now exists primarily to seize land and maximize 
power. This is important context for unpacking the military reforms that Upton will 
propose upon his return to the United States. 
Upton visits and studies a number of European countries on his grand tour, among 
them Italy, England, Russia, and France. His analyses and conclusions of the preceding 
four countries are largely the same. He appreciates the novelty of their tactics, he is 
extremely captivated by the way in which all of Europe has cultural, professional 
officership so ingrained in their societies, and he applauds the interconnectedness of the 
military and the government. His real groundbreaking work is done on Germany and 
Austria. It is from these countries’ systems that Upton gleaned most of his ideas for how 
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the US should operate. Indeed, some have even argued that he took too much from 
them.ii88 
The first thing that stands out about Upton’s analyses of Germany and Austria is 
the sheer length. Combined, they total more than seventy pages. That is about one fifth of 
the entire book, for only two countries analyzed. Upton is absolutely enamored of the 
Germans and Austrians. He is extremely praiseworthy of their general staff system, one 
that was unique at the time. He marvels openly at its efficiency and they way in which it 
frequently rotated quality officers from the staff, to the line, and back.89 He is also 
impressed by the robust system that existed for officers to rate their subordinates and 
recommend them for promotion or reassignment.90 He devotes several pages to detailing 
the Austrian and German versions of what the modern US Army would call an “Officer 
Evaluation Report.” The high turnover rates and frequent ratings by superiors helped to 
prevent the careerism and the entrenching of incompetent officers that Upton so resented 
during the American Civil War and throughout the rest of his career. Some of his own 
frustration at the slow rate of promotion comes through in his analysis: “the effect of the 
staff arrangement, and promotion by selection, is to enable intelligent and efficient 
officers to obtain while young the highest grades in the army, in which, at any moment, 
they may be called upon to influence the destiny of the nation.”91 Implicit in this 
summation and immediately apparent to any informed contemporary, was that the United 
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States lacked such a system, a point he subsequently probes in painstaking detail in his 
Conclusion. 
Upton pays particular attention in his Austrian and German sections to the way in 
which both countries trained and readied their general populations for war. In his sections 
detailing the organizational models of both armies, he takes pains to outline both their 
peace and war footing models. While these are not the only two countries to be classified 
with such a dichotomy, they are certainly by far the most detailed. Unique in the analyses 
of Austria and Germany is a description of how they actually muster their armies during 
peace and war. Upton details in his study the general reserve of the German Army, their 
“Ersatz Reserve,” which is further broken down into two classes of service of varying 
duration, a furlough list of men that were granted early separation from the Ersatz 
Reserve, a general troop depot that funneled men into the Ersatz Reserve, and finally, a 
“Landsturm.” The Landsturm effectively served as a stable for universal training until 
young men could be absorbed into the regular army or any reserve component explained 
above.9293 Men that were past their term of service transitioned into the “Landwehr.” The 
Landwehr was effectively a home guard, reserved for men that had done their time with 
the colors and returned home.94 Universally trained male populations like those that the 
Germans and Austrians boasted bred a remarkable civil-military understanding into the 
foundations of their societies. 
Upton unabashedly marvels at and jealously covets the German system. For a 
military man, a society so tightly interwoven with martial virtue would certainly seem 
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“the dream.” It is precisely this enthusiasm for the German model that garnered Upton 
some very harsh criticism, both from his contemporaries and posterity.95 As 
contemporary historian Brian Linn puts it: “Upton wanted to replicate another nation’s 
[Germany’s] military structure, but without transposing the underlying philosophy of war 
that had created these forces and guided them to victory.”96 In other words, the contention 
was that Upton failed to understand that the unique combination of conditions that 
existed in Germany to create their military apparatus were not the same in the United 
States, and that thusly, the attempted “cookie-cutter” transposition of a foreign military 
system would inevitably fail. While these criticisms are not without merit, they do 
nothing to change the very real impact that Upton’s work had in his time, and afterward. 
In 1878, Emory Upton compiled and published his complete observations from 
abroad in the form of The Armies of Europe and Asia, an exhaustive study of the tactics 
and organization of ten countries and their military establishments. As explored 
previously, Upton spends most of his ink in Armies describing the tactics and force 
structures of a given country before summing up his findings and making 
recommendations in his “Conclusion.” But as mentioned, Upton had already made great 
contributions to tactical reform within the Army (in fact, he won his general’s star during 
the Civil War for validating a new way in which heavily fortified earthworks might be 
taken at the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse).97 He published manuals on infantry and 
artillery drills that were already taking hold at all levels of the post-Civil War United 
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States Army.98 So with his study of the armies of Europe and Asia, the ambitious Upton 
sought to do something more than simply reform at the tactical level. He instead sought 
to apply the lessons he learned overseas to a comprehensive reform of American military 
policy. Resultantly, the ideas Upton advocates in the Conclusion of The Armies of Europe 
and Asia were nothing short of revolutionary. They represented an effort to completely 
overhaul the Army’s force structure and the means by which it filled its ranks. 
To build his case, Upton begins by highlighting many of the shortcomings that 
plagued the Army’s system for personnel induction in previous conflicts.99  His Civil War 
experiences made painfully clear to him the unnecessarily high price in blood and 
treasure that the American citizenry is forced to pay when the Army has neither a readily 
available levy of trained citizen-soldiers prepared to fill out the ranks of the regular army, 
nor a pool of competent and educated officers to lead them. His comparison of the U.S. 
Army during the War of 1812 to other countries fighting similar wars of aggression made 
clear to him the shortcomings of poorly trained citizen-soldier armies in offensive 
campaigning, explicitly articulating for the first time one of the fundamental lessons to 
American policymakers that emerged from that conflict.  
The most radical proposition made in Armies, however, was Upton’s call for 
universal military service through the formation of a group he (somewhat misleadingly) 
dubbed “The National Volunteers.” Upton’s first enumerated point in his list of lessons 
from his journey was the sincerely democratic sentiment that: “…every citizen, in 
consideration of the protection extended to his life and property, is held to owe military 
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service to his government.”100 From this fundamental premise he expounded a system of 
short-term conscription founded on the principle of universal service. In the Conclusion 
of Armies, Upton laid out a peacetime draft that would be “national in character and local 
in outlook,” meaning one that was federally controlled and that marshaled conscripts 
directly into the regular army, but that was administered at the local level.101 
Upton also provides a thorough outline of an entirely re-imagined regular army 
force composition that could more readily absorb a massive influx of volunteer or 
conscript soldiers upon the country’s pivot onto a “war footing.”102 In this way, Upton 
argues, much of the “wasted life” that inevitably ensues when utterly green troops are 
thrown into the maelstrom of combat alongside one another could be curbed.103 Upton 
concludes the Armies of Europe and Asia with that sentiment: “The organization of 
national volunteers would give us in time of peace the regular army, a reserve, and the 
militia, and would enable us in time of war to prosecute our campaigns with vigor and 
economy, and with that regard for human life which becomes a free people.”104 Under the 
proposed “Uptonian” system, every American male would have a baseline competence in 
infantry drills and tactics, regardless of whether or not he made a career of the Army. 
When called into service, inexperienced conscript or volunteer companies would serve in 
the same battalions alongside companies of the regular, professional Army, thus 
dramatically reducing the human cost of war to the United States. 
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The most compelling case Upton makes for National Volunteers has little to do 
with tactics or military expediency, however, and more to do with the health of American 
civic life and democracy as a whole. Upton, despite being derided by many historians as 
“a profoundly undemocratic, militaristic zealot” and “pessimistic” in his outlook, was an 
idealistic man of conviction who harbored a deep, unshakeable faith in American 
institutions.105 He believed that the Army was the oldest and greatest institution in 
America, and that accordingly, it should be representative of its people. Upton was 
painfully aware that the US Army of the past and present, an Army that could count 
fractions of a percent of the country’s population in its ranks except for in a few instances 
of major war, was not representative of the nation at large. The lesson was not lost on 
him, and so with his National Volunteers, Upton sought to change that. The first point 
that Upton gives in outlining the foundational values of the National Volunteers reads: 
 “1. The declaration, that every able-bodied male citizen, between certain ages, owes his country 
 military service – a principle thoroughly republican in its nature, as it classifies in the same 
 category, and exposes to the same hardships, the rich and the poor, the professional and non-
 professional, the skilled and the unskilled, and educated and uneducated.”106 
 
Upton believed that the Army could be the ultimate democratic experience in the United 
States. As he specifies in the preceding quote, nowhere else in public or private life are 
the rich and the poor, the ruling elites and the disenfranchised working classes, the 
established American and the immigrant, thrown together in such a pure meritocracy and 
in such dramatic circumstances, as the military, particularly a military at war. Upton felt 
that this would be extremely healthy for the country, and perhaps more importantly, 
extremely healthy for his beloved Army. 
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Upton understood that an organization such as the National Volunteers, an outfit 
which stood to be mobilized whenever the country went to war, would engage a wider 
cross section of American society and thereby keep the American public better attuned to 
the activities of its military forces. Ultimately, he hoped that coercing the populace into 
military service would lead the people to “regard the army as the only true field for the 
exercise of courage and patriotism,” and that the army and the people it defended would 
become inextricably linked.107 Upton explicitly articulates this point: “The adoption of 
such a system [the National Volunteers] would at once tend to nationalize and popularize 
our Army.”108 A popular army would serve to demystify the military to the public, and 
foster a more informed and educated citizenry that was personally invested in the actions 
and welfare of its army. 
Upton was extensively read and admired by most of his colleagues, including 
successive Commanding Generals of the Army (the precursor to the Chief of Staff 
position) Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Philip Sheridan.109 Despite that, he 
never got much traction in implementing his proposed organizational reforms. There 
remained a genuine and spirited debate among the officer corps, played out in the 
journals, in the press, and over simple “mess hall” discussion, about the proper role of the 
Army in society. While Upton advocated grand reform in the shape of a massive force 
reorganization and reinjection of martial virtue into society, many of his peers were 
staunchly opposed to Upton’s grand proposals.  
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There were those in the officer corps that actually liked the hard-bitten nature of 
frontier duty. They appreciated the challenge. As Brian Linn puts it: “The army’s 
constabulary duties on the frontier required officers to make both war and peace and to 
function as police as well as soldiers.” They also took pride in the ruggedness of it all, 
Hugh L. Scott recalled one “pacification” mission in which he “swam icy rivers, braved a 
blizzard, marched almost 500 miles, and successfully arrested a few individuals who had 
fled their reservation.”110 Frontier service was hard and rigorous, and some men took 
pride in doing a job that none of their countrymen wanted. A New York Times opinion 
piece from an unnamed frontier officer praises the Army and the uniquely American 
nature of the service it performs on the frontier: “The greater portion of our military 
service is of a kind which no other army in the world could be got [sic] to perform. This 
outpost duty, in which our troops pass their lives, is one which European 
armies…perform only for fixed periods.”111 He goes on to praise his fellow officers, “the 
officers are buoyed under this terrible task by the influence of resources and education, 
by the voice of honor, and the hope of distinction.”112 He also comments on the size of 
the United States Army, offering a dramatically different view than that which Upton 
advances. He claims that the American people are “so essentially a non-military people, 
that our standing army is in some measure forced upon us by…the immensity of our 
frontier and the ever increasing complexity of our relations with other powers.”113 The 
most savage attack and potential counterpoint to Upton comes at the end of his article, 
however: “there can be no doubt that the attempt to keep Comanches, Apaches, and 
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Seminoles in check with the same sort of force which we use to fight British regulars and 
quell insurrections of our citizens, is very absurd.”114 While men like Upton called for a 
large, rigid army with an assertive presence in the lives of everyday Americans, other 
voices within the ranks were content to remain a grizzly, underappreciated frontier 
constabulary on the fringes of society, performing an unglamorous but necessary service 
to the nation. 
Further impeding Upton’s efforts to reform was the fact that the American people 
(and the officer corps, for that matter) had just recently closed the book on the bloodiest 
conflict in American history, and martial zeal among the general public was 
understandably flagging. So while Upton had success convincing fellow officers of the 
merits of his tactical thinking, the bigger-picture reorganization of the US Army that he 
envisioned in The Armies of Europe and Asia and that he had begun to lay out in earnest 
in the early drafts of what would be his seminal work, The Military Policy of the United 
States, was not to be.  
In the social and political climate of the years following the Civil War, even with 
a personal friend in the White House in U.S. Grant, Upton’s calls for major reform went 
unheeded. While the War Department itself was not much interested in major strategic or 
organizational overhaul, the biggest stumbling block was the people’s body itself: 
Congress. The Democrat controlled South grudgingly accepted that it had to be a part of 
the Union, but it certainly had no interest in expanding Union influence in the lives of 
Southern sons and grandsons anymore than absolutely necessary. Upton noted in Armies 
that none of his “plans can be successfully executed, nor can any other plan be devised 
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for prosecuting our wars with economy of life and treasure, without special legislation 
looking to the increased efficiency, and radical reorganization of the army.”115 From a 
divided Congress representing war weary constituents, no such legislation would be 
forthcoming.  
Contributing to the lack of enthusiasm for Upton’s proposals, or perhaps the cause 
of it, the federal government and its army had no large pressing concerns to attend to in 
the aftermath of the Civil War. By the mid nineteenth century, the United States had 
demonstrated beyond doubt to any would-be invader that the country was capable of 
defending itself. The specter of foreign invasion no longer loomed as large as it had in 
previous decades. Therefore, neither the American people nor their elected officials saw 
any need to invest a great deal of taxpayer dollars and citizen sweat into the Army. As far 
as they were concerned, no threat that demanded such a readiness posture existed. Here 
we can identify a fundamental divide between the motivations of Upton and the general 
American public. While Emory Upton was concerned with preparing for the next “big 
one,” and catering US policy to the direst potential personnel needs, the general 
population only wanted to address the most pressing problem of the day. That problem 
was indubitably the ongoing war being fought on America’s western frontier. But that 
conflict against the Indians did not require a great effort on the part of the American 
people, as far as they were concerned. Enough men were choosing to join the Army to do 
the job with which it was tasked. The public saw no reason that they should be compelled 
to do anything where they did not see a pronounced need for their service. 
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Upton was discouraged by his failure to give impetus to a dramatic overhaul of 
American military policy after Armies, but he did not quit on the idea. Upon finishing his 
manuscript for Armies, Upton immediately began work on what he felt would be his 
legacy work, his pièce de résistance, his immortal contribution to the United States 
military intellectual tradition: The Military Policy of the United States. In this book, 
Upton sought to trace American military policy from the Revolution through the Civil 
War “ and to show at what expense and treasure and blood a nation must prosecute wars” 
and in the process expose the “folly and criminality” of previous American policy.116  
In Military Policy, Upton built upon old arguments made in Armies while 
providing greater historical and theoretical evidence for them. Historian Stephen 
Ambrose distills Upton’s suggestions as follows: “The military forces of the United 
States should consist of the regular army, the National Volunteers which would be trained 
and officered by the regulars on an expansive system, and the militia, to enforce the laws 
and suppress insurrections.”117 The case he makes for his reforms is rooted extensively in 
campaign-by-campaign case studies from every major American war.118 He looks at each 
example of American inefficiency or failure on the battlefield and explains how his 
system might have mitigated it. Upton’s work is on the whole a thorough, comprehensive, 
and painstakingly researched contribution to the American military intellectual tradition. 
The largely positive feedback that drafts of Upton’s work received from his fellow 
officers (including William T. Sherman) and the correspondence of contemporary 
officers allow us to speculate that Upton’s compiled wisdom represented the general 
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thoughts and opinions of the mainstream of the Army officer in the late nineteenth 
century.119 
Emory Upton was a tortured soul. In 1870, his beloved wife died. He would 
mourn her for the rest of his life. In 1878, when he published Armies, the critical praise 
his work garnered and the early (but fleeting) support that his ideas had on Capitol Hill 
had him extremely hopeful of getting legislation through Congress that would turn his 
lifelong dreams of international military fame and acclaim into reality. His hopes were 
dashed. In 1881, while assigned as Colonel of the 4th Artillery at what is now the Presidio 
in Monterey, California, a depressed and migraine-addled Emory Upton sat down at his 
desk to write a letter of resignation to the Secretary of War, put his .45 caliber service 
revolver to his temple, and shot himself through the head.120 His death utterly rocked the 
Army officer community. Though he believed himself a failure after his failed national 
reform efforts, Upton’s colleagues and superiors in the Army thought more highly of 
him.121 Many of the most influential men in the country attended his funeral, and Upton’s 
pallbearers included the massively famous generals Edward D. Townsend, James H. 
Wilson, and William T. Sherman. 
At the time of his death, Upton had not yet finished The Military Policy of the 
United States. While a few of his friends and colleagues had seen drafts of chapters, 
nobody had yet seen the entire manuscript. In his will, Upton had appointed his best 
friend and West Point classmate Henry DuPont to finish the book in his stead.122 But 
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DuPont was extremely busy running his family’s chemical business (yes, that DuPont) 
and was thus unable to devote the necessary time to completing the manuscript, while at 
the same time refusing to publish it before it was “absolutely perfect.”123 Years passed, 
and the Army officer community became more and more frustrated with DuPont. But 
DuPont only kept getting busier (he was ultimately elected to the United States 
Senate).124 Accordingly, the Military Policy of the United States remained unread, its 
lessons unlearned, and the institution that it could have helped continued to stagnate. The 
Army near the end of the nineteenth century remained a force structured to fight Indians 
that no longer existed that would be no match against an organized and competent first-
rate power. 
Then, in 1898, the country went to war. Luckily, the enemy was neither organized 
nor competent. The Americans handily won the Spanish-American War, but at a 
remarkable, unnecessary cost. During that war, there was no general staff coordinating 
overall strategy. There was no institutional apparatus for inter-service coordination. There 
was no sophistication to the logistics supporting overseas operations in two hemispheres. 
Soldiers ate rancid meat or starved. More than two thousand died from disease.125iii The 
American public was outraged, and the Secretary of War (Russell A. Alger) was 
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unceremoniously fired.126 This sacking created an opening for the ascendancy of the 
greatest friend that Emory Upton never had: Secretary of War Elihu Root.  
The so-called “Root Reforms” still represent the most thorough and dramatic 
changes to the Army and its composition in the nation’s two hundred and thirty eight year 
history. A largely overlooked feature of those reforms is that they were almost entirely a 
product of Emory Upton’s intellectual and scholarly efforts.  
Root took office knowing that he needed to enact dramatic changes to the 
organization and structure of the War Department, and he fielded suggestions from, 
among other places, his own officer corps. They collectively pointed him in the direction 
of Emory Upton’s work (further evidence of Upton’s popularity and widespread 
acceptance in that demographic). Root quickly read The Armies of Europe and Asia, as 
well as a biography of Upton written by a friend and West Point professor Peter Michie. 
Then Root heard about the manuscript of Military Policy that was collecting dust in 
Henry Du Pont’s office. He demanded that DuPont hand it over. DuPont complied, 
perhaps more out of guilt than anything else. Root then set a pair of promising young 
officers to the task of editing and revising Upton’s work in preparation for widespread 
publication. Finally, in 1904, the War Department published The Military Policy of the 
United States. 
With the text of Military Policy as a backbone, Root enacted major military 
reforms. He streamlined the command and control of the Army, at long last creating an 
American General Staff with a single Chief of Staff of the Army who served as the senior 
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ranking member of the military and reported directly to the Secretary of War’s office.127  
Root also enlarged the standing army, put tighter constraints on the state run National 
Guards so as to allow for their smoother transition into active service, and created a 
system of interchangeability between staff and line assignments for the officer corps to 
ensure that decision makers did not lose sight of the realities of war for the man at the 
front.128  
Suddenly, Emory Upton’s name and work was at the tip of everyone’s tongue in 
Washington. Military Policy went through four printings before 1914, all sponsored by 
the War Department. Congress frequently published and distributed select chapters. The 
Army War College held essay contests on Upton’s works. Most importantly, “Upton’s 
spirit presided over the 1916 hearings on national defense,” as every speaker either made 
direct mention of him or discussed his works.129 The press at the time went so far as to 
call him a “military genius.”130 In a sense, Emory Upton had been vindicated. He had 
always been respected, but he was finally being listened to at every level of the 
government and military hierarchy. 
But while the Root Reforms made the United States Army a much more efficient 
and effective combat force, it did not make it substantially more democratic or 
representative of the American public. An important area that the Root Reforms 
neglected to address, perhaps the key area, was the means by which the Army was put 
together. Root completely sidelined Upton’s concept of the National Volunteers, and with 
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it any notion of universal military obligation in the United States. The peacetime Army 
would always be larger after Root’s tenure as Secretary of War, but it was still only a 
small percentage of the population writ large, and except when directly engaged in 
significant overseas conflict, the public was largely detached from it. The Army would 
stumble through the cycle of massive, rapid expansion for conflict and equally rapid 
demobilization two more times before another American military official would make an 
earnest call for compulsory national service and the forced democratization of the armed 
forces. This time, however, it would come from the very top of the uniformed hierarchy 
in the person of one of the most respected men in American history: George Catlett 
Marshall. 
George C. Marshall and Universal Military Training 
 George Catlett Marshall was born into a comfortable middle class family in 
Uniontown, Pennsylvania on December 31, 1880.131 A descendant of an old, prestigious 
Virginia planter family, he chose to attend the Virginia Military Institute upon 
completing high school. Four years later in 1901, Marshall graduated from VMI and 
commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Infantry Branch of the United States 
Army.132 Marshall saw action as a Platoon Leader and Company Commander in the 
Philippines and several other of the guerilla campaigns that characterized the decade and 
a half bridging the turn of the century to WWI, as well as rotations as both a student and 
an instructor at the School of Infantry and Cavalry (today the Command and General 
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Staff College) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.133 When the Great War came, Marshall was 
deployed to France. First, he served as the chief planner for the 1st Infantry Division. His 
success there earned him a quick transfer to the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) 
Headquarters, where he worked very closely with General John “Black Jack” Pershing, 
the commander of all AEF troops in Europe and Marshall’s mentor.134 It was while 
serving on Pershing’s staff that Marshall met John McAuley Palmer, a man that would 
prove to be extremely influential on Marshall later in his career. It was also while serving 
as a staff officer in Europe during WWI that Marshall distinguished himself as a 
prominent officer in the US Army of the future, and singled himself out for future general 
stars. 
 Between the wars, Marshall served in a number of capacities in Washington D.C. 
and elsewhere. He commanded the 15th Infantry Regiment in China for three years, as 
well as the Vancouver Barracks in Washington State.135 Most of his assignments in the 
inter-war years, however, were fundamentally related to policymaking, what the modern 
Army might classify as being a part of “Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).” 
Marshall taught at the Army War College, oversaw the Infantry School’s publications 
(thusly he was instrumental in distilling the infantry’s lessons from WWI), and in July of 
1938, as a Brigadier General, Marshall was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army. 
It was in this era of his career that Marshall began to distinguish himself as a prescient 
and insightful military mind. In his capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff, Marshall attended a 
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White House meeting in which President Roosevelt proposed a plan for a massive air 
force buildup, at the expense of the Army. Every attendee of the meeting tacitly agreed, 
except Marshall, who, when asked by the President himself, boldly and honestly replied, 
“Mr. President, I am sorry, but I don’t agree with you at all.”136 Most of Marshall’s peers 
believed he ended his career with his audacity. Instead, on 23 April 1939, Marshall was 
summoned into President Roosevelt’s second floor White House study. There he was 
informed that he would be appointed the next Chief of Staff of the Army, a position he 
would occupy for the entirety of the Second World War.137 
 The first great challenge that Marshall faced during the war was turning the 
underfunded and archaic army of 174,000 men that he inherited in 1939 into a viable 
fighting force that could stand up to seasoned German, Italian, and Japanese troops.138 
The rush to get men into theatre forced Marshall to approve an extremely abbreviated 
training regimen for all troops (except those in Airborne units) that gave the average 
American private on his way overseas only a primitive understanding of the weapons, 
equipment, and basic soldier skills that he would be implementing in the face of the 
enemy.139 That dearth of quality men and material was put on painful display throughout 
the early American involvement in the European theater, with defeat after defeat 
characterizing the hapless American efforts against the seasoned and savvy troops of 
Erwin Rommel’s much vaunted Afrika Korps. Even as late as mid-1944, some American 
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soldiers destined for line service were being only nominally trained in the use of weapons 
and tactics actually in practice in theater.140 
 The experience of having to frantically rush to the field an army capable of 
standing up to a first-rate power stuck with Marshall for the rest of his life, and convinced 
him finally and unshakably of the merits of the ideas of his old friend and colleague John 
McAuley Palmer. Born in 1870, Palmer was a decade older than Marshall. Like Marshall, 
he was a career infantry officer. Palmer and the primacy he puts on citizen-soldiery are 
considered in many ways to be the antithesis of Emory Upton, though that is not an 
entirely fair claim. It is true, however, that while Upton was a proponent of maintaining a 
significant standing force of military professionals as the primary prosecutors of 
American wars, Palmer advocated and wrote extensively on precisely the opposite.  
 In 1911, Palmer accepted a post on the Army General Staff, where he was 
instrumental in instituting a number of tactical reforms and reorganizations.141 Palmer 
read and rejected the wartime expansion system articulated by Upton in Military 
Policy.142 In 1912, he published The Report of the Organization of the Land Forces of the 
United States, as part of a report issued by the General Staff. In this document, Palmer 
reviews previous applications of militias, and reaches similar conclusions about their 
ineffectiveness.143 But rather than write them off as previous thinkers had (especially 
Upton), he instead proceeded to offer a defense of them and their potential value. He 
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proposed possible solutions that would, in contrast to Upton’s expansive model of 
professional officers leading citizen-soldier troops, preserve an unfettered citizen-soldier 
character in a large, quickly mobilized army. In 1916, these ideas were more 
meticulously laid out in his book, An Army of the People.144 
 After WWI, Palmer, then a full Colonel, again served on the Army General Staff, 
where he effectively became the primary formulator of American military policy.145 
Palmer was the greatest driving force behind the formulation and passage of the National 
Defense Act of 1920, which formally established the prevailing “Army of the United 
States” as a three-part organization consisting of the Regular Army, the National Guard, 
and the Organized Reserve.146 This system was intended to inextricably bind the citizen-
soldier model to American military policy, forcing upon the general American public a 
stake in all future conflicts. It was by this profoundly democratic military theorist (as well 
as by his own war experiences) that Marshall was most influentially socialized and 
professionally developed with regard to personnel policy. 
 While Marshall was unquestionably an adherent to Palmer’s policy proposals, he 
accepted them for different reasons than Palmer initially posited. Ever the pragmatic 
general, Marshall pushed for Universal Military Training (UMT) primarily as a means of 
meeting the incredible demands that would immediately be placed upon the country’s 
military in the event of a land war with the Soviets, while still enabling the American tax 
payer to enjoy some margin of a “peace dividend” following the massive moral and 
monetary expenditure that was the Second World War. Amidst the backdrop of the 
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rapidly escalating Cold War, Marshall appeared before Congress in 1947 and stated: “We 
[the US] must find some method of maintaining a sufficient military posture, one 
sufficiently strong without the terrific expense of a large standing military 
establishment.”147 Marshall recognized that the United States was facing a military 
readiness challenge that was unique in American history. The years of 1941 – 1945 had 
seen the ascendancy of the United States to unquestioned super power status. As the War 
was coming to a close in 1945, President Roosevelt introduced the concept of the United 
States as a global leader (and implicit in his view, a global police force). He called for the 
US to take a larger and more assertive international role, strengthen ties with allies to 
avoid future conflicts, and for the US to step out on the world stage as “a larger 
organization for world peace.”148 The US position at the end of WWII as encapsulated by 
President Roosevelt bookended the process begun by FDR’s uncle’s Great White Fleet 
thirty-eight years earlier. Only now, the successful pursuit of American policy 
necessitated a great deal more than sixteen battleships and various escorting 
accoutrements. Genuine and assertive global leadership necessitated ready access to an 
incredible body of prepared manpower. 
 As the Chief of Staff of the Army in the wake of WWII, General George C. 
Marshall was concerned with preparing precisely that trained and ready force for a land 
war on the European continent against the Soviets. As early as October of 1945, while 
still serving as the nation’s senior uniformed official, Marshall began publicly advocating 
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not just a continuation of the WWII draft, but the institution of Universal Military 
Training for eighteen to twenty year old males.149 A very public national debate sprung 
from Marshall’s efforts, and he continued to champion his cause while serving as 
Secretary of State and later Secretary of Defense to President Harry S. Truman. 
Testifying before Congress in 1948, Marshall said “The concept of universal service and 
military training reaches back more than 150 years. The father of His [sic] country 
recognized the need for a citizens’ army based on reserves of trained manpower.”150 
Marshall asked Congress to approve a plan for universal training, claiming, “in every 
national emergency…our military efforts have been hampered, our very national 
existence has been imperiled, by the lack of trained reserves.”151 The main thrust of 
Marshall’s call for UMT was that it was militarily expedient and necessary to the defense 
of American interests in Europe and around the world.152 Marshall sought to save any of 
his successors, and more importantly, his countrymen, from having to cope as he had 
with a grossly unprepared and underequipped military that would be forced into the field 
before it was ready.  
 So, with President Truman’s blessing and Palmer’s advice, General and later 
Secretary Marshall introduced UMT before Congress. He testified on numerous 
occasions on its behalf. The system that he outlined, as previously alluded to, stipulated 
that upon turning eighteen, all males would report for one year of military training. Upon 
the completion of their training, they would be organized in a general reserve for six 
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years following. It would be from this pool of ready, trained men that mass armies would 
be conscripted, when needed.153 In contrast to Upton’s expansive model that necessitated 
a large enough professional officer corps to lead an Army bolstered to its war footing, 
Marshall’s model would have formed a system under which a “comparatively small 
professional force [was] reinforced by a well trained and effectively organized citizen 
reserve.”154 Marshall’s citizen-soldiers would have been led by their own officers, thus 
preserving its civilian character, while the fact that they were already “well trained” and 
“effectively organized” would preserve an acceptable caliber of combat effectiveness (if 
not quite equal to that of the professionals). President Truman threw his weight behind 
the proposed system as well. In numerous addresses to Congress, Truman outlined the 
benefits of UMT for the country, citing among other things that the reduced standing 
army would save the country money in the long run, that compulsory service would 
instill in young Americans a proper understanding of citizenship and responsibility, and 
that such a system would manifest a uniquely American fighting force characterized by 
equality and inclusivity.155 The UMT system, if executed properly, would inexorably tie 
American armed forces to the ideal of the citizen-soldier upon which the nation was 
founded. But despite the strong argument put forward by these very high profile and 
venerated public servants, a panoply of private and public interests lined up in opposition 
to Marshall’s proposal.  
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 The most vehement opposition to Marshall’s UMT came from educators and from 
Congress.156 The education community feared that a one or two year interruption in 
young Americans’ education for military service would homogenize the worldviews of 
an entire generation. They worried that it would limit democratic instruction and hamper 
intellectual progression. They also feared cooptation by the federal government. If public 
service was to be nationalized and made compulsory, why not education as well?157 State 
institutions like public education above all others feared the potential for overreach by the 
federal government. The most assertive and thorough rejection of UMT, however, as it 
had roughly eighty years earlier in Emory Upton’s day, again came from the people’s 
branch: Congress. 
 While there were some sympathetic members of the House and Senate that 
supported UMT, the majority of Congress had a litany of grievances against the policy 
that were very publicly aired from the end of WWII through the early years of the 
following decade.158 On its face, much of Congress rejected UMT because they believed 
it to be too costly and that it would be ineffective, despite the assurances of the 
administration and the army that UMT would actually save money in the long run. There 
was also the growing consensus among policymakers in the late forties that large-scale 
conventional armies were a thing of the past. A New York Times Op-Ed from 1947 
reflects this idea: “only a wasteful government would spend money to train an army for 
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something we would never need [a large scale ground war].”159 The Soviet experience on 
the Eastern Front of WWII was still fresh in America’s collective mind. The Soviet 
ability, but more importantly, their willingness, to throw millions upon millions of men 
into a meat grinder as a legitimate military strategy demolished the Germans and 
demonstrated to the West that the Red Army would not be beaten conventionally except 
at an unfathomable price, a price that both the Russians and the Americans knew the 
West would not pay. But the Americans found a way around their unwillingness to bleed 
on such a scale. While the Soviets made a great statement to the world by steamrolling 
their way into Berlin in May of 1945 and raising the “Sickle and Hammer” over a burned 
out Reichstag, the Americans answered with an equally forceful statement of their own. 
On 6 August 1945, the Americans debuted for the world (and in Russia’s backyard) the 
most destructive weapon in human history. It was American ingenuity’s counterpoint to 
pure Russian brawn, and arguably, the first day of the Cold War. 
 By 1947, the nuclear age had dawned in earnest, and it was in this context that the 
debate over UMT played out. While the US in 1947 had a monopoly on “the bomb,” 
legislators and policymakers knew that it was only a matter of time before the Soviets 
had one too (they got it in 1949). That eventuality, as far as contemporary detractors from 
the UMT model were concerned, would have rendered obsolete both the offensive and 
defensive application of large formations.160 An American army massed around any key 
objective would face nuclear annihilation, if it could even beat the Red Army 
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conventionally in the first place (which many did not believe they could).161 Detractors of 
UMT in Congress perceived themselves to be forward thinking. They felt that large 
armies were relics of a pre-nuclear era, and they felt that the adoption of UMT would be 
an example of the United States government and military preparing to fight the next war 
with the tactics that won the last one.  
 The real heart of the public debate went beyond questions of sheer military 
expediency, however. At the core were issues of citizen responsibility and the limits of 
democratic governance, a revisiting of the core American principles upon which the 
nation was founded. There prevailed in most of the arguments against UMT a great fear 
of an American militarism that would spring from having a militarized male population. 
It was argued that universal conscription, even if for a brief time in a young man’s life, 
was a dangerous departure from the American tradition, one that smacked of Prussian or 
German practices.162 Having a ready and available reservoir of trained troops might make 
for a more bellicose and belligerent American public, the logic being that one would 
more readily resort to the sword if it were always sharp and kept within arm’s reach. This 
militarism, it was argued, would subordinate American men and women to the needs and 
whims of the military, thus encroaching on the civilian liberties that the military exists to 
uphold and defend in the first place.163 In the words of famous contemporary historian 
Charles Beard, UMT would “violate every liberty to which our nation has been dedicated 
since the founding of the Republic.”164 Critics responded to advocates claims that UMT 
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would instill a reliance on the democratically principled citizen-soldier by arguing that 
the opposite would in fact be the case. They felt that UMT would actually destabilize 
American values. Detractors postulated that UMT was antithetical to citizen-solider 
values because conscripts would be plucked and absorbed into a compulsory, national 
organization and not fighting out of a concern for the local and the immediate. This is a 
somewhat ironic inversion of Marshall’s assertions about the democratizing effect of 
shared mandatory service, but it made for a compelling argument nonetheless. Ultimately, 
UMT detractors saw the proposal as a profound threat to the long held American ideal 
that those who sacrifice freedom for security deserve neither.165 They did not see the 
merits of impinging individual liberty in any way in order to prepare for uncertain future 
conflicts. 
 Marshall attempted to address all of these issues with his congressional 
testimonies and public appeals from 1945 – 1948. He rejected the notion that large-scale 
armies were a thing of the past. He believed that nuclear weapons were a weapon of last 
resort and that a very high threshold for their use existed. He believed that the best way to 
meet the readiness challenges of the latter half of the twentieth century, and to ensure that 
the United States would never again be caught flat-footed as they had in the early years of 
WWII, was to train a massive pool of potential conscripts that would be ready for line 
service in only the time it took to mobilize them.166 He further couched this argument in 
fears of a potential Soviet attack on the United States mainland, facilitated by new 
weapons such as jet fighters and supersonic bombers, and the prevalence of quick strike 
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forces such as mechanized and airborne troops. Marshall articulated that in the event of a 
ground war on American soil against potentially overwhelming Soviet ranks, a deep, 
trained reserve would be vital to mounting a coherent defense.167 Making that case more 
compelling, Marshall argued that the existence of a large, trained citizen force in the US 
and the world’s awareness of its existence would actually serve to raise the perceived cost 
of a US invasion, and thusly deter foreign (Soviet) aggression.168 
  Marshall acknowledged the criticisms of congressional leaders and private 
citizens that UMT would place a burden on the American people, but he felt that it was 
entirely justified and worth the cost.169 Not only for the boon it would provide to national 
security and military readiness, but also because, again channeling his friend and mentor 
John McAuley Palmer, he saw an inextricable link between civic obligation and the long 
standing citizen-soldier and militia history of the United States (there was also the added 
benefit to Marshall that UMT would ensure that young Americans grew up to be ‘good 
boys’ and not communists). To accusations that compelling Americans to serve during 
peacetime was undemocratic and un-American, Marshall stated that UMT was “only un-
American if universal education and paying taxes are.”170 With that sentiment, Marshall 
was making the point that compulsion exists at all levels of American society, 
compulsion that inconveniences the individual in pursuit of the greater good. No one 
debated the democratic merits of free public education or tax-supported infrastructure. 
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Marshall considered his proposal to be along the same lines, and posited that the very 
universality of his plan ensured that it was democratic. 
 In the end, Universal Military Training died with a whimper, not with a bang. The 
debate that raged around UMT from 1945 – 1952 ultimately ended in failure. UMT 
petered out due to public apathy, more than anything else, driven by opponents’ 
arguments that mandated military service threatened the democratic notions of individual 
liberty and that it would not be worth the political or economic cost. President 
Eisenhower’s accession to the presidency in 1952 was a further setback to UMT 
legislation. Eisenhower’s implementation of the “New Look” (a reliance on nuclear 
weapons and strategic air power) in conjunction with his policy of “massive retaliation” 
for any foreign incursion convinced the interested parties in the American public that 
UMT was a relic of a bygone era, and therefore not worth the cost.171 But even though 
UMT failed, the issues it raised, and the idea of engaging citizen-soldiers in the Army as 
an alternative to an expensive, standing, professional army, divorced from the public, 
remained extremely relevant through the end of the twentieth century, and continues to be 
so today. 
V.  The Modern Professional Army: A Perilous Course? 
When John F. Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower as President in 1960, he deviated 
from and indeed rolled back much of the previous administration’s military policy. The 
New Look emphasis on air power and nuclear weapons and its adherence to a policy of 
“massive retaliation” as a means of nuclear deterrence was supplanted by Kennedy’s 
policy of “flexible response.” As a super power engaged in a global war on communism, 
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Kennedy wanted the US to be able to flex its substantial military and paramilitary muscle. 
This meant that the United States Army was once again catapulted into relevance. One 
principle from the Eisenhower administration that Kennedy did hold fast to, however, 
was his notion of the “Domino Theory.” The theory held that if one country fell to 
communism, others in its region would likely follow suit. So when North Vietnam began 
to turn red at a time when the incumbent US President believed in the merits of military 
interventionism and construed North Vietnam’s political shift as a threat, the stage was 
set for conflict. What ensued was one of the great debacles in American history: the 
Vietnam War.  
 What emerged from the death of the draft after Vietnam was the modern “All-
Volunteer Force.” In 1970, a bi-partisan presidential committee headed by Thomas J. 
Gates was tasked with creating a plan to maintain military strength without conscription. 
Their study produced the “Gates Commission Report.” The Report concluded that a 2.5 
million-man force could be maintained through voluntary service, provided that certain 
incentives were offered.172 An increase in pay was proposed, as well as comprehensive 
improvements in the conditions of military service. To fill a volunteer levy, the recruiting 
effort was re-envisioned and better resourced.173 The Gates Commission concluded, in 
essence, that a small stripe of the American populace would be willing to bear the 
nation’s military burden, they just needed to be properly incentivized. As a result of their 
recommendations conscription was ended in 1973, and the extant AVF was born. 
 At first this seemed to be a match made in heaven. The post-Vietnam Army didn’t 
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want unwilling conscripts injected into its ranks any more than those conscripts wanted to 
be there. The Army was quite content to be left to its own devices. In the midst of the 
incredible culture wars of the 1970’s, the Army became a professional organization 
dedicated to martial virtue, its members self-selected from society because they wanted to 
be “better” than the rest. The AVF cultivated (and continues to cultivate) elitism among 
its members. “We don’t promise you a rose garden” became the sales pitch that appealed 
to a small slice of the general American public. But the Army’s problems were many, in 
the early seventies. While the AVF concept gave the Army the insulation from society 
that it so badly wanted, it still lacked a clear identity and mission. Their failure in 
Vietnam precipitated doubts about the Army’s war fighting abilities, both in the general 
public and within the ranks. 
 Many officers regarded some aspects of the All Volunteer Force concept very 
warily, however, particularly in the context of their collective Vietnam hangover.174 It 
cannot be overstated the extent to which Vietnam degraded the institution of the United 
States Army. The men themselves were exhausted, morale was abysmal, and the “good 
order and discipline” which every military takes as its foundation was a joke. By the early 
1970’s, many American line units were positively impotent.175 Vietnam was truly a 
disaster, one for which the military predominantly blamed politicians. The Army felt as 
though it had been thrown into an unfair fight with inept troops while having their 
strategic options limited.176 They felt as though the politicians had set them up for failure 
and then blamed them for it. It was a modern American take on the dolchstoßlegendeiv 
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myth.177 The question for Army policy makers in the wake of Vietnam, then, became 
how to avoid fighting a war like it ever again. They recognized that with the 
psychological and geographic distance that the military and the American public were 
quite happily putting between themselves through the implementation of a professional, 
all volunteer force, that they might actually be laying the foundation for future overuse. 
 The Army Chief of Staff during this pivotal era of transition was General 
Creighton Abrams. While the military as a whole welcomed the idea of separating and 
distancing themselves from the society they were sworn to defend, they did not want to 
become so far removed as to enable politicians (another demographic the military 
regarded warily) to use the military without thorough forethought. The officer corps of 
the seventies and eighties still wanted to find a way to tie their fate to that of the 
American people. The regular army felt as though it had been left out in the cold in 
Vietnam. Though there was a draft on, neither the Army Reserve nor the various National 
Guards (where the sons of the rich and well connected were hiding) were ever called up 
and sent over seas. The political cost of doing so would have been too high, so they were 
never used, and a wildly unpopular, unwinnable war was allowed to drone on. General 
Abrams sought to ensure that such a thing would never be allowed to happen again. 
Pursuant to that, Abrams restructured the task and organization of the three components 
of the United States Army such that no one component (specifically the Regular Army 
component) could go to war without the other two. The National Guard and US Army 
Reserve become fundamental to the Regular Army’s ability to function in combat. In this 
way, Abrams designed an Army with incredible inertia. If it was to go to war, the entire 
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organization, all three components, would have to go to be mobilized, effecting the 
American public much more deeply than if just the perennially insulated Regulars were 
sent overseas. As a uniformed military member, Abrams very deliberately hamstrung 
elected decision makers and limited the choices available to them by raising the political 
cost of war to a nigh untenable degree. 
 In an effort to further buttress themselves from Vietnam-like wars, the Army 
shuffled its doctrine in addition to its fundamental force structure. The Army developed 
new doctrine for a new kind of war, called “AirLand Battle.” It was to be a seamless 
integration of aerial and ground pounding capabilities within the Army and across 
services, utilizing “fast-moving, well dispersed tactics.”178 AirLand Battle was the 
doctrine applied in Grenada, Panama, and in the liberation of Kuwait, to smashing 
success.179 In turn, these victories restored the Army’s confidence in itself. The 
professional army for the first time in American history acquired the swagger and 
cocksure competence for which it is known today.  
 Developing simultaneous to AirLand Battle and also in direct response to the 
Army’s experience in Vietnam, concepts like the “Powell Doctrine” came to the fore of 
American military intellectual thought. General Powell articulated that when force was to 
be used, it should be applied in a merciless and overwhelming fashion, as quickly as 
possible, so as to smother the enemy’s ability to resist. No more limited wars. A 
Clausewitzian inspired return to the World War II practiced “war of annihilation” 
mentality again came to prevail in the Army. The intent behind this policy was to keep 
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the army out of the painful, protracted conflicts that defined the majority of the three 
decades following WWII. The Army was trying to do structurally and doctrinally what its 
civilian leadership had failed to do legislatively. From the early eighties through to the 
turn of the century, they were remarkably successful. 
 September 11th 2001, and the ensuing “Global War on Terror” shattered that sense 
of success. The American mission in Afghanistan at first seemed to validate the 
American defense sector’s newfound understanding of the potency of American 
weaponry and military professionalism. The rhetoric of American commanders during 
the Afghan war smacked of that of Army Air Corps generals professing the unparalleled 
potency of strategic bombing during World War II. A small contingent of highly trained 
special operations forces and a very liberal application of precision-guided 2000lb 
JDAM’s (bombs) had throttled the Taliban and put Al Qaeda on the run in a matter of 
weeks. It seemed that the United States had conquered the historically unconquerable 
Afghanistan, adding to a litany of recent successes and once again validating the efficacy 
of the small, highly trained, “high-speed, low drag” professional army.  
 The early days of Iraq appeared to have done the same thing. The monumental 
military success that was the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist state and the 
military upholding it (the fourth largest in the world at the time) was the final jewel in the 
crown that the Army needed to validate its claim of being the best fighting force in the 
world. AirLand battle, in the form of “Shock and Awe,” had finally been tested in an 
unfettered war of annihilation against a worthy adversary, and it had proven itself to be 
beyond reproach. The Army never got to fight the Soviets in the Fulda Gap, and they 
were forced to stop short of total victory in round one against Iraq, but in 2003, the 
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American military was finally told: “sic ‘em.” They did so with remarkable savagery and 
mesmerizing efficiency…and in a matter of weeks. Unfortunately, the difference between 
conquest and occupation would soon be driven home to painful degree by America’s War 
for the Greater Middle East.180 
 In the buildup to the 2003 invasion, then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Erik 
Shinseki, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that  "something in the 
order of several hundred thousand soldiers" would be required to effectively stabilize Iraq 
after the Hussein regime was toppled.181 This figure was hundreds of thousands of men 
greater than the number that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his Deputy, Paul 
Wolfowitz, were claiming to need. General Shinseki was approaching the problem of 
how to topple and then stabilize Iraq from the standpoint of military expediency. 
Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz approached it from the standpoint of political expediency. They 
knew that they would be unable to field an army of several hundred thousand combat 
troops without a massive influx of human capital into the military (i.e. a draft). But Iraq 
could not be invaded with a draft army. So an ugly public debate over troop requirements 
ensued, that ended with Rumsfeld prevailing and General Shinseki’s rather ignominious 
retirement three months after the invasion.182 Of course, history has shown General 
Shinseki to be a rather prescient chap. Iraq was an unmitigated disaster. American 
travails in that country also took the strategic focus off of the ongoing Afghan War long 
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enough to allow the situation to deteriorate there, as well. As a result, the United States 
Army became embroiled in not one but two protracted, poorly defined conflicts of 
ambiguous strategic value. In this way, two of the least popular wars in the nation’s 
history, Iraq and Afghanistan, have also become our longest.183 
 A little more than forty years after the establishment of a professional army in the 
United States, the American system eerily resembles that which the nation’s Founders so 
feared and abhorred. The U.S. Department of Defense is today the largest employer in 
the world, and includes over 700,000 active and reserve personnel in the United States 
Army alone.184 Adding to that sum, today’s professional military is supplemented on the 
battlefield by privately contracted military professionals, “soldiers of fortune” in the 
truest sense of the term. With the draft off the table today, the government has been 
forced to turn to companies such as Blackwater (now Xe) to sufficiently fill out the ranks 
to wage wars that would have previously required broader mobilization. This 
professionalized and sometimes-privatized force is busier than at any time in American 
history, though only 1% of the population shares the burden. Under the extant 
professional system, the American public has been guiltlessly divorced from its military 
as at no other time in American history. 
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today violating that fundamental tenet. 
 The current American Army, manned and led predominantly by career oriented 
professionals, represents a significant departure from the way in which the country met 
its manpower needs for the first two hundred years of its history. In a perverse inversion 
of the grievances of the “Occupy Wall Street” movement, since 1973, 99% of the 
American public has exploited the 1% of their countrymen who chose to assume the 
burden of the nation’s defense.185 The events of the “Global War on Terror” have starkly 
and brutally driven that point home. For soldiers and officers in the United States Army 
from 9/11 to the present, life has been a ceaseless merry-go-round of twelve to fifteen 
month deployments and returning home only to start scaling up for the next one. As one 
Master Sergeant put it, “2006 – 2009 are just gone. I was either in Iraq or Afghanistan or 
in a yellow-phase,v jumping out of airplanes every day, getting ready to go back in six 
months. That’s three years of my life that I’ll never get back.”186 That sergeant’s 
experience is typical. Having two deployments under one’s belt is the standard in today’s 
United States Army, even among junior officers and NCOs. As it was during Vietnam, 
the institution of the United States Army is today exhausted. Unlike during Vietnam, 
however, the general American public has not been asked, or forced, to share in that 
exhaustion. The American people have been allowed by their government to carry on 
their lives as normal. Indeed, the transition to a professional army has encouraged the 
general public to indulge in easy, no-cost jingoism. Everyone “supports the troops,” but 
nobody wants themselves or their kids anywhere near what it is they ask those troops to 
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do. Instead of three citizen-soldiers, plucked from society, going on the three 
deployments to which the previous quote refers, the burden of those many months of 
combat fell to but one professional soldier. Extrapolate that to the entire Army and the 
roughly two million Americans that have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since 
2001, and a troubling picture begins to emerge.187 The American concern for its troops 
might be likened to a thin layer of ice on a lake. It is a mile wide, but an inch deep…and 
it bears little weight. 
 The professional force has lent itself not only to neglect, but also to rampant 
overuse. Andrew Bacevich draws attention to the lower threshold for war that exists 
when the broad American public doesn’t have “skin in the game.”188 His argument is in 
essence that listening to politicians weigh military intervention is much easier for a 
citizenry to ignore when the ramifications of those interventions are abstract and remote. 
If a citizen can shelter himself and his family from the consequences of the actions of the 
nation as a whole, war becomes more tolerable. That lower threshold for military action 
and decreased citizen interest in military affairs brought on by personal insulation from it 
has fostered the conditions for a fundamental drift in the military’s mission. The Army 
was founded to win independence from England and secure the nation’s borders. It 
evolved into an expansive force for the dispossession of the Native Americans. Then, as 
the American global footprint expanded, the Army became an implement of modest 
international power projection. In all of those instances (with the notable exception being 
the Indian Wars), sustained operations were made impossible by the privately interested 
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and fundamentally non-martial character of the larger body of American forces brought 
to bear. But with the advent of the professional force, the military and the Army in 
particular have become the “go to” implement of American foreign policy. Indeed, in a 
2012 memo for the Department of Defense, “Defend the Homeland” was only the seventh 
bullet/priority in the subsection “Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces,” right 
behind “Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent.”189 Figure III 
illustrates the frantic pace of military intervention brought about by the military’s mission 
creep, and the American public’s indifference to it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, Figure III. illustrates the generally upward trend in foreign military 
interventions since the transition to the professional army in 1973. The high water marks 
on the graph correspond to eras of increased US colonial activity, while dips generally 
correlate to eras of economic hardship. 
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 After more than a decade of war, the United States Army and the military 
generally is entering a time of transition. The modestly bolstered Active Duty force 
required to prosecute two simultaneous wars is being curtailed, slightly. Civilian leaders 
and military brass alike are devoting a great deal of time and energy to thinking about the 
future military needs of the United States. Now might be an opportune time to consider 
the track record and ramifications of the professional Army over the last forty years, 
particularly the debacle that was the last decade, and think about a potential change of 
course. Instead, however, the American reliance on the professional military is being 
redoubled. 
 President Obama’s 2012 strategic guidance memo to the Department of Defense, 
entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” would 
be a truly horrifying read for any signatory of the Declaration of Independence or The US 
Constitution. The document is a bald-faced, cocksure assertion of American global 
primacy. It articulates the American need to defend its interests and those of its allies in 
the western Pacific and South East Asia.190 It discusses ongoing and expanded counter-
terror operations in the Middle East and Africa.191 It claims that the United States will be 
ready and willing to “confront and defeat aggression anywhere in the world.”192 In the 
President’s own words, “the United States will remain the greatest force for freedom and 
security that the world has ever known.”193 How is the American military of the future 
going to accomplish those many daunting tasks, one may ask? The answer appears to be-- 
with an even smaller, better trained, and more insular force of military professionals than 
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it fields today. 
 The Defense Department’s vision of the future is labeled “Joint Force 2020.” The 
planned future military will be “smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready and 
technologically advanced.” It will be led by the “highest quality, battle tested 
professionals.” It will have a global presence emphasizing Asia-Pacific and the Middle 
East, while still ensuring the ability to retain American defense commitments to Europe 
and strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions. To proponents of the 
citizen-soldier ideal, this document is the formula for a nightmare of military 
professionalization in which the soldiers that fight for American democracy continue to 
move uncomfortably closer to soldiers of fortune, and represents the perpetuation of, and 
expanded reliance on, a fundamentally flawed military policy.  
 Many tout the strength and unparalleled combat effectiveness of the modern 
American military. It is certainly true that no citizen-army the United States has ever 
assembled is as proficient or deadly as the professional force it sustains today. The 
United States Army of today and tomorrow will “win the battle.” But any war is much 
more than a mere collection of battles, and while the professional United States military 
has never lost a major engagement, it has never really won a war. 
An alternative system to the current force composition must be found. While they 
are far from perfect, the ideas of Emory Upton and George Marshall have merit and 
should be re-evaluated. Train up a larger force of citizen-soldiers and keep it in reserve, 
to be drawn upon during crises to fill out a relatively small, permanent professional cadre 
of officers and men and women. Because the citizen-soldier is pulled from civilian life, 
he or she will remain rooted in the wider, contemporary culture and democratic values. 
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 Fundamentally, people just don’t like war. As America’s historic reliance on 
conscription highlights, people are understandably reticent to put their lives on the line 
for what are often personally abstract reasons. But if war is to be considered a necessary 
evil, which sometimes it is, a society must find a fair and democratic way by which to 
distribute the burden of military service amongst its people. That fundamental concept is 
critical to keeping the military a part of American life, and ensuring that when the 
country goes to war, it does so very deliberately, and with its citizenry bearing the 
nation’s standard in the vanguard of the formation, not being dragged along unwillingly, 
behind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84
                                                        
Explanatory Notes 
 
i
 “Lifer” is military jargon for a career soldier. These are individuals that are entirely 
immersed in military culture and consider themselves to be distinct from the rest of 
society (Page 5).  
 
ii
 Most prominently Russell Weigley and Stephen Ambrose, and most recently David 
Fitzpatrick, have accused Upton of taking too much from the German and Austrian 
models. They contend that he directly lifted their manpower models and tried to force 
them upon a United States that had evolved different civil and political institutions from 
Germany. Institutions that were fundamentally incompatible with a “Prussian” system 
For further reading, see Russell Weigley, the American Way of War and David J. 
Fitzpatrick, "Emory Upton and the Army of a Democracy," The Journal of Military 
History 77 (April 2013): 463-90 (Page 41). 
 
iii
 Exactly 2,061 men died of disease during the Spanish-American War (Page 53). 
 
iv
 The stab-in-the-back myth (German: Dolchstoßlegende) was the widely held notion in 
the German Army after WWI that they had not lost the war, but in fact had been betrayed 
by a weak willed, unpatriotic civilian population on the home front (Page 71). 
 
v
 The Army classifies its units’ deployment readiness in three phases. “Red phase,” 
otherwise known as “Reset,” is the organizational rest and refit time in the months (or 
weeks) after returning from an operation or a deployment. “Yellow Phase,” the most 
strenuous phase in the training cycle, is when the actual deployment preparation takes 
place. A line unit in Yellow Phase spends the majority of its time in the field training at a 
high tempo for an impending deployment. “Green Phase” is reached when the unit has 
validated all of the tasks related to its mission set and is considered available for overseas 
deployment. The cycle restarts for the unit upon return from deployment. What would 
often happen to guys coming off deployments at the height of the war, however, was they 
would come back home with their unit and then be rotated out to a different unit that was 
in yellow phase with an imminent deployment. (Page 78). 
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